Cited by

Dispositional departures are based on the defendant’s characteristics, focusing on w hether he is “particularly suitable for individualized treatment in a 3 probationary setting.” State v. Solberg , (quotation omitted).

“[A] single mitigating factor may provide a substantial and compelling reason to impose a downward durational sentencing departure if it shows that the defendant’s conduct in committing the offense of conviction was significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense in question.”

State v. Solberg , -24 (Minn. 2016).

Moreover, the prior conviction is likely construed as an offense - related factor whereas “[a] dispositional departure typically focuses on characteristics of the defendant.” ; see also Heywood, d at 244 (stating that when justifying dispositional departure, district court may focus “more on the defendant as an individual and on whether the presumptive sentence would be best for him and for society”) 6 Because the district court’ s reason for imposing the d

See, e.g., State v. Solberg , (recognizing that defendant’s “use of his overwhelming physical size and strength” to cause victim to submit to un wanted sexual contact “f its squarely within the statute’s prohibition of sexual assault by coercion”); (affirming criminal-sex ual

1 A defendant may enter a Norgaard plea when he “is unable to remember the specific facts of the offense” due to intoxication or amnesia, but has reviewed the state’s evidence against him and believes that he “is likely to be convicted of the crime charged.” n.1 (Minn. 2016); see also State ex rel.

Therefore, departures are discouraged unless “there are ‘identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a departure.’” State v. Solberg , (quoting Minn. Sent.

But to make a valid Norgaard plea, the defendant must admit “that he or she is likely to be convicted of the crime charged.” n.1 (Minn. 2016).

Because “a single aggravating factor may, by itself, justify an upward durational departure,” -25 (Minn. 2016), we decline to consider whether the record also supports the district court’s determination that J.K.

–26 (Minn. 2016) (discussing lack of remorse as aggravating factor).

“We review a district court’s decision to depart from the presumptive guide *418 lines sentence for an abuse of discretion.” (citation omitted).

As discussed in State v. Solberg , dispositional departures focus on the characteristics of the offender and durational departures focus on the seriousness of the offense itself.

But “[a] durational departure must be base d on factors that reflect the seriousness of the offense, not the characteristics of the offender.”

“The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines es tablish presumptive sentences for felony offenses.”

when granting a downward durational departure.” State v. Solberg , , aff’d

(explaining that when the district court’s reasons stated on the record for a departure are improper or inadequate, our past practice has been to independently review the record to determine whether sufficient evidence justifies a departure f

see Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd.

Even in the presence of aggravating or mitigating factors, “the court may exercise discretion to depart but is not required to depart,” , because “departures are justified only in exceptional cases.”

which involved upward durational departures in multiple consecutive sentences, says nothing to call into question the propriety of a single presumptive sentence based on alleged “mitigated offense severity.” Case also points to State v. Solberg, an opinion in which the supreme court stated “that a sin gle mitigating factor, standing alone, may justify a downward durational 6 departure.” –25 (Minn. 2016).