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Inferences Drawn from the Circumstances Proved Finally, we consider the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved “to determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” (quotation omitted).

Second, we independently consider “whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.”

called the circumstantial- evidence standard of review.”

When considering claims for sufficiency of the evidence, we “conduct a painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury to reach its verdict.” (quotations omitted).

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (concerning Rule 403); n.1 (Minn. 2017) (concerning Rule 402); see also Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326–27.

“If a reasonable inference other than guilt exists, then we will reverse the conviction.”

“When the direct evidence of guilt on a particular element is not alone sufficient to sustain the verdict, however, [appellate courts] apply a heightened [] standard, which we have called the circumstantial-evidence standard of review.”

(“When the direct evidence of guilt on a particular element is not alone sufficient to sustain the verdict, however, we apply a heightened two-step standard, which we have called the circumstantial-evidence standard of review.”).

Second, we analyze “whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017).

D. Reasonable Inferences from the Circumstances Proved Next, we independently examine the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from these circumstances “to determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” (quotation omitted).

In applying that test, we use a “heightened two-step standard,” first identifying the circumstances proved by the state and second considering whether those circumstances “are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” (quotation omitted).

the circumstantial-evidence standard of review.”

[is] called the circumstantial-evidence standard of review.”

Next, we “determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” (quotation omitted).

In reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, we first identify the circumstances proved by the state, giving deference to the fact-finder’s “acceptance of the [s]tate’s evidence and its rejection of any evidence in the record that is inconsistent with 5 the circumstances proved by the [s]tate.”

This is “the traditional standard of review, which applies whenever the direct evidence establishing a particular element of a crime is alone sufficient to support the jury verdict.”

(quotation omitted); see also U.S. Const. amend.

(requiring that there be a rationale hypothesis of innocence).

When evaluating the sufficiency of direct evidence, “we conduct a painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury to reach its verdict.” (quotation omitted).

Second, we “determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” (quotation omitted).