Cited by

vindicates the fundamental principle that no citizen should be held accountable for a violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain, or subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed[.]” (quotation and citation omitted).

(stating that “the rule of lenity applies only after the other canons of construction have been exhausted and what remains is a grievously ambiguous statute”).

When engaging in statutory interpretation, we first “determine whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous.”

n.4 (Minn. 2017) (citing Kratzer v. Welsh Cos., LLC , d 14, 21 (Minn. 2009)) (stating that the imputed common- law canon only applies after it is determined that the text is ambiguous); n.2 (Minn. 2019) (citing Thonesavanh, d at 439 n.4).

(stating that “the rule of lenity applies only after the other canons of construction have been exhausted and what remains is a grievously ambiguous statute”).

If the statute is ambiguous, “then we may apply the canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity.”

The first step in interpreting a statute “is to determine whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous.”

The MBCA does not define that phrase or the terms “indemnified” or “indemnify,” see Minn. Stat. §§ 302A.011, .521, and therefore, we look to a dictionary for their plain meaning

We acknowledge the canons of construction provide us with a method to determine the definition of “luxury passenger automobile.” d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017) (stating that the first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the statute is ambiguous, and if the statute is ambiguous, then courts “may apply the canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity”).

(looking to dictionary definitions to determine ordinary meaning of terms not defined by statute).

The “related-statutes canon” of statutory construction, which deals with statutes that are “in pari materia, is an extrinsic canon that applies only to ambiguous statutes.” (emphasis added) ().

The first step in interpreting the statute “is to determine whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous.”

In addition, the canon of word association directs that “when context suggests that a group of words have something in common, each word should be ascribed a meaning that is consistent with its accompanying words.” –42 (Minn. 2017).

(noting that dictionary definitions are “not foolproof or failsafe”); (concluding that multiple and conflicting dictionary definitions were “nondefinitive”).

(explaining that the rule against surplusage “favors giving each word or phrase in a statute a distinct, not an identical, meaning”).

3 -38 (Minn. 2017) (discussing the canon of in pari materia).

State v. Thonesavanh, 9 (quotation omitted).