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When a defendant and counsel disagree about which issues to raise on appeal, “counsel has no duty to include claims which would detract from other more meritorious issues.” (quotation omitted).

But an appellate court may address the claim in a direct appeal if there is “no need for additional 7 facts to explain the attorney’s decisions.” n.1 (Minn. 1997).

But we may address an ineffective-assistance claim in a direct appeal if “there is no need for additional facts to explain the attorney’s decisions.” n.1 (Minn. 1997).

An appellate court can address an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in a direct appeal if there is “no need for additional facts to explain the attorney’s decisions.” n.1 (Minn. 1997).

(d 83, 85 n.1 (Minn. 1997)).

An appellate court can address an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim if there is a sufficient record, meaning there is “no need for additional facts to explain the attorney’s decisions.” d 83, 85 n.1 (Minn. 1997).

(d 83, 85 n.1 (Minn. 1997)).

(d 83, 85 n.1 (Minn. 1997)).

(d 83, 85 n.1 (Minn. 1997)).

( d 83, 85 n.1 (Minn. 1997)).

State v. Barnes , d 325, 335 (Minn. 2006) (citing Black v. State , n.1 ( Minn. 1997)).7 Likewise, Reek’s claims regarding his counsel’s alleged failure to effectively cross- examine some witnesses relies on facts not found in the record.

of counsel claim should be raised in a postconviction petition for relief, rather than on direct appeal” on the ground that “a postconviction hearing provides the court with ‘additional facts to explain the attorney’s decisions,’ so as to properly consider whether a defense counsel’s performance was deficient.” (quo ting Black v. State , n.1 (Minn. 1997)).

See Black v. State , , 85 (Minn. 1997) ; see also Lussier v. State , , 152 (Minn. 2014).

5(17)-(19), as recognized in Black v. State , , 86 (Minn. 1997).

5, as recognized in Black v. State , d 83, 86 (Minn. 1997).

at 626 (emphasis omitted) (), A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that cannot be decided on the district court record because it requires additional evidence, however, need not be brought on direct appeal and may be brought in a posteonviction petition.

rd of reasonableness” or, second, that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Arredondo, d at 571; (stating that “appellate counsel is not ineffective for fa iling to raise issues that themselves have no merit”); (concluding that appellate counsel was not ineffective for not raising issue that counsel deems without merit).

“Once a direct appeal has been taken, all claims raised in that appeal, all claims known at the time of that appeal, and all claims that should have been known at the time of that appeal will not be considered in a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” ( Knaffla, 309 Minn. at 252, d at 741).

Generally, an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is raised in a petition for postconviction relief rather than on direct appeal because a postconviction hearing provides the court with “additional facts to explain the attorney’s decisions.” n.1 (Minn. 1997).

we reformulated the Knaffla rule as follows: once a direct appeal has been taken, all claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims that were known or should have been known but were not raised in the direct appeal are procedurally barred.

Leake, d at 535 ( Knaffla, 309 Minn. at 252, d at 741).

(“We will not allow [the petitioner] to avoid the Knaffla limitation simply by restating an evidentiary issue in terms of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.”); *746 110 (Minn.2006).

to support this proposition.

5(17-19), Liptak v. State ex rel.

(noting “that an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is generally Knaffla- barred in a postconviction petition if the claim can be decided on the basis of the trial record and the briefs”); see also Leake, d at 535-36

“Once a direct appeal has been taken, all claims raised in that appeal, all claims known at the time of that appeal, and all claims that should have been known at the time of that appeal will not be considered in a subsequent petition for postconvietion relief.” ( and State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252 , ).

(deciding to evaluate the merits of petitioner’s claims although his 10-year delay “alone may be sufficient grounds” for dismissing his petition); -86 (Minn.1997) (holding that although the petitioner’s claims were either procedurally barred or meritless, the 18-year delay between his conviction and the filing of his petition was “a sufficient basis for affirming” the district court’s denial of the petition); Houghton v. State, 296 Minn. 494, 495 , d

(citing State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252 , ).

f justice exception to Knaffla , fairness requires substantive review of his claims because of: (1) the refusal to grant petitioner a complete set of trial transcripts, (2) the bias of the postconviction judge, (3) the “improper procedural default” caused by appellate counsel’s advice, (4) the uneonstitutionality of Knaffla , (5) and (6) the improper procedural default of Zenanko’s ineffective assistance of counsel issue.

(basing claim on an issue "specifically addressed on direct appeal is without merit.’’)