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Accordingly, in homicide cases, “the state may offer information about the victim’s life, but may not use it as an attempt to influence the jury’s decision on the basis of prejudice or passion.”

Judges’ Ass’n, Minnesota Practice–Jury Instruction Guides § 3.02, at 45-46 (7th ed. 2024); -52 & n.7 (Minn. 2012); -38 & n.1 (Minn. 1998); Jones, d at 907-08 & n.2, 911; Kelley, d at 907 & n.1, 910.

-38 (Minn. 1998) (alterations in original).

Likewise, the state’s 3 is misplaced.

The declarant’s state of mind may be shown not only through direct evidence, such as a statement expressing the declarant’s belief that they are dying, but it also may be inferred from the surrounding circumstance s. Bergeron, d at 923

20(4) (stating that the jury may be discharged without a verdict if the court finds there is no reasonable probability of agreement); (instructing a deadlocked jury to continue deliberating to “try to work through [the] impasse” was considered a permissible instruction).

6 As with other evidentiary rulings, a review ing court generally de fers to the trial court’s discretion in admitting relationship evidence, and reviews unobject ed-to evidence for plain error, State v. Word

-38 (Minn. 1998) (alterations in original).

See Davis, 735 d at 682; (noting that “the defense had an opportunity to rehabilitate the appellant on re-direct and to respond to the remarks in closing argument, clearly lessening the possibility that the remarks contributed to the verdict”).

(stating that “the defense had an opportunity to rehabilitate the appellant on re-direct and to respond to the remarks in closing argument, clearly lessening the possibility that the remarks contributed to the verdict”); (noting that “

See State v. Buggs, 15 -39 (Minn. 1998) (reasoning that an earlier instruction reduced prejudicial effect of subsequent potentially coercive instruction).

State v. Buggs , d 329, 336 (Minn. 1998).

-38 (Minn. 1998) (alterations in original).

at 911; see Cox, d at 551-52 (concluding that the district court did not coerce the jury to reach a verdict in part because the district court instructed the jury on CRIMJIG 3.04 before deliberations and did not communicate to the jury that a verdict needed to be reached in response to a question from the jury); -38 (Minn. 1998) (holding that district court’s instructions to deadlocked jury that it “[c]ontinue to try to work through [its] impasse” and that “further introspective contemplation of

Unfair prejudice means an “unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” (quotation omitted).

-39 (Minn.1998); (citing A.B.A.

Unfair prejudice means an “unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” (quotation omitted).

See, -91 (Minn.2006); Swanson, d at 658

-36 (Minn.1998) (evidence that the declarant was shot “seven or eight times in her chest, abdomen, arm, and thigh,” was found lying in a pool of blood, struggling to breathe, and died within hours after she was shot, was sufficient for the trial court to conclude that the declarant had a firm belief in her impendi

(excluding homicide victim’s hearsay statements reflecting defendant’s past threats and abuse); Ulvinen, d at 428 (stating homicide victim’s state of mind was not at issue).

(holding photograph showing victim with his family photograph fell within the prosecutors latitude in showing victim and was not unduly prejudicial); (holding that prosecutor’s attempt to present murder victim as a thoughtful, friendly, hard-working individual and the mother of a four-year-old child, or showing victim’s picture before and after her death did not go beyond the pale of giving the victim a “spark of life” nor was its matter-of-fact na