Cited by

(“The jury determines the credibility and weight to be given the testimony of witnesses.”).

With respect to determinations of guilt based on direct evidence, as compared to circumstantial evidence, appellate courts “view[] the evidence and any reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the state” and determine whether “the jury could reasonably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

With respect to determinations of guilt based on direct evidence, as compared to circumstantial evidence, appellate courts “view[] the evidence and any reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the state” and determine whether “the jury could reasonably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

(holding that a jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant would not have had a reasonable belief of peril when the defendant inflicted a “mortal wound,” the victim lay weaponless on the ground, and the defendant paused for at least 30 seconds before shooting the victim again); Sta

easoning that the excluded testimony restated or repeated reputation evidence that the jury had heard from other witnesses, and therefore, it was “cumulative or unnecessary to the case.” (discussing excluded testimony from a defendant claiming self-defense that he was aware of the victim’s police record and reputation for violence); -51 (Minn. 1988) (affirming the district court’s decision to exclude as cumulative a defendant’s testimony about “prior witnessing of street violence” offered to sho

( and Minn. Stat. § 609.20(1) (2018)).

State v. Buchanan , (Mi nn.

See, (holding defendant’s emotional state alone will not mitigate murder to manslaughter).

Evidence is cumulative if it “merely dupl icate[s] other evidence already presented.” (analyzing the exclusion of evidence under Minn. R. Evid.

(stating that an appellate court will not reverse a district court’s evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion) ; see also State v. Buchanan , ( discerning no abuse of discretion where excluded evidence that “merely duplicated other evidence already presented” was cumulative).

Regarding the nature of the killing, we have looked at "the number of wounds inflicted, infliction of wounds to vital areas, [and] infliction of gunshot wounds from close range," State v. McArthur , , 50 (Minn. 2007), as well as the period of time between the infliction of wounds and firing additional shots after the victim was incapacitated, State v. Buchanan , , 547-48 (Minn. 1988) (shooting a victim once, pausing, walking around the victim, and firing two more shots supported an inference of

Bland, d at 384; 1 This piece of evidence is inadmissible both because Zumberge did not prove that he was aware of it at the time of the shooting, and it would have been hearsay if offered through an officer’s testimony.

(“[W]here first shots are followed; by a pause and second shots, an inference of premeditation is proper.”).

(holding there was no abuse of discretion where excluded evidence duplicated other evidence and was thus cumulative and delaying).

at 399-400; -46, 548 (Minn. 1988) (noting that the defendant had a duty to retreat before acting in self-defense because the shooting took place in the parking lot adjacent to his apartment).

The jury determines the credibility and weight to be given the testimony of witnesses.” (citations omitted).

The existence of premeditation is generally “inferred from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the crime.” ().

2704, 2711 , 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987)); (noting that “the defendant’s constitutional right to give testimony regarding his intent and motivation is very broad” but that the “right is not without limitation”).

See generally, (stating that defendant’s constitutional right to give testimony must be balanced against relevancy requirement); (stating that in a criminal case defendant has right to present a defense in accordance with the rules of evidence); Minn. R. Evid.