Cited by

5 (2022); superseded in part by statute, 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 248, § 7, at 838 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd.

veral mediations and two moderated settlement conferences—were extensive and detailed because the “bottom-line figure showing Wife what she would actually be receiving” was “nowhere to be found.” At the hearing on wife’s motion to vacate the stipulation, wife’s lawyer expressly waived this argument, stating, “The second [Tomscak] factor is[,] were there detailed and 5 (explaining that, in a proceeding in which spousal maintenance is awarded, the parties may agree to divest the district court of

The denial of spousal maintenance and this Court’s divestiture of f urther jurisdiction on the issue of spousal maintenance, d 501 (Minn. 1989), as codified at M.S. § 518.552, subd.

The judgment and decree contains the following language: Pursuant to the provisions of Minnesota Statutes section 518.552, subdivision 5, and consistent with the “Karon waiver” both parties hereby waive their right to bring spousal maintenance modification motions to modify the amount or duration of spousal maintenance as set forth herein.

would pay “nontaxable spousal maintenance” and changed the description of the cash payment from a “cash 2 –03 (Minn. 1989), a Karon waiver is an agreement to waive any future ability to modify spousal maintenance.

1 Karon v. Karon , (allowing parties to stipulate that they waive any right to future modification of maintenance; codified into law pursuant to 1989 Minn. Laws.

Importantly, form number DIV406 includes language that comports with the requirements for waiving modification of spousal maintenance in the future as set forth in Karon v. Karon , 03 (Minn. 1989).

And when reviewing stipulations, the district court “has a duty to protect the interests of both pa rties and all the citizens of th e state to ensure that the stipulation is fair and reasonable to all.” Karon v. Karon

for the principle that a district court must ensure that a stipulation is “fair and reasonable to all.” While we agree that parties cannot, by stipulation, divest a district court of its authority to evaluate the fairness of an agreement, we are convinced that the district court properly exercis

ncing January 1, 2013, in the amount of $2,000 per month for 36 months and $1,500 per month for 12 months thereafter.” The dissolution judgment included the parties’ agreement to divest the district court of jurisdiction over modification of “the term and/ and Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd.

In support of his motion, husband provided a list of expenses, which includes some upward and downward adjustments of expenses from the affidavit that husband filed during the dissolution; primarily, husband asserted that his mortgage expenses had greatly 1 -504 (Minn. 1989), the supreme court held that parties may enter into an enforceable stipulation to prohibit or limit modification of maintenance awards.

5 (addressing statutorily required elements for a Karon 6

But “[a district court] has a duty to protect the interests of both parties and all the citizens of the state to ensure that the stipulation is fair and reasonable to all.” superseded in part by statute, Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd.

superseded in part by statute, 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 248 § 7 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd.

See, (“Family dissolution remedies, including remedies in child support decisions, rely on the district court’s inherent equitable powers.”); (noting that the district court is a third party to dissolution proceedings and has the “duty to protect the interests of both parties and all the citizens of the state to ensure that the stipulation is fair and reasonable to all”); -58 (Minn. 1981) (“Al

-45 (Minn.1994); superseded in part by statute, 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 248, § 7, at 838 (codified at Minn.Stat.

See, ("In the interest of judicial economy, parties should be encouraged to compromise their differences and not to litigate them.").

Such a waiver agreement is frequently referred to as a (superseded in part by statute).

The maintenance section concluded with the following language: “” As to child support, the decree provided that “the parties [were] unable to agree on the basis (income) to be used or the percentage the children spend with each parent.” Thus, the decree ordered that “[e]ach attorney * * * prepare and submit to the court their respective position concerning child suppor

1 See, (stating that “[ojnce maintenance payments end, the court is without juris *288 diction to modify maintenance”); (Coyne, J., dissenting) (stating that “it is well settled that where there is neither an award of maintenance nor a reservation in the decree of jurisdiction of the issue of maintenance for later determination pursuant to section 518.55, the district court cannot thereafter award maintenance” (citing

In a dissolution proceeding, a district court has “a duty to protect the interests of both parties and all the citizens of the state to ensure that the stipulation is fair and reasonable to all.”

The district court is “a third party to dissolution actions” and, as a third party, has “dut[ies] to protect the interests of both parties” and “to ensure that the stipulation is fair and reasonable to all.”

2 (2002) (granting trial court power to determine permanent award on basis of statutory factors); (affirming divestiture of jurisdiction clause when determined by an approved stipulation of parties).

(allowing for an express waiver of spousal maintenance).

(holding district court (1) is third party to dissolution actions; (2) has duty to protect interests of both parties and all citizens of state to ensure “stipulation is fair and reasonable to all”; and (3) has authority to refuse to accept *283 proposed dissolution stipulation “in part or in toto.”).

-04 (Minn.1989) (when we approved and enforced the parties’ express waiver by stipulation of any right to seek a spousal maintenance modification), (when we cautioned that, to have binding effect, a stipulated waiver must contain both the contractual waiver of the st