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“[The particularity] requirement prohibits law enforcement from engaging in general or exploratory searches.”

“This requirement prohibits law enforcement from engaging in general or exploratory searches.” (noting that the prohibition against general warrants prevents “exploratory rummaging through a person’s 16 belongings”).

This particularity requirement “prohibits law enforcement from engaging in general or exploratory searches.”

“Appellate courts give great deference to the factual findings of the court issuing a warrant and will reverse ‘only if clearly erroneous.’” (); see also Souto, d at 747 (explaining that appellate courts’ “review of a district court’ s probable cause determination is limited, with great deference afforded to the issuing court”).

The purpose of the particularity requirement for searches is to prohibit “general or exploratory searches.” State v. Bradford

IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10; (listing exceptions to search-warrant requirement).

“This requirement prohibits law enforcement from engaging in general or exploratory searches.” (noting that the prohibition against general warrants is intended to prevent “exploratory rummaging through a person’s belongings”).

–43 (Minn. 1998); –800 (Minn. 2000); – 28 (Minn. 2005); –64 (Minn. 2009); Peltier, d at 803–05.

Minn. R. Evi d. 801(c), 802, 803

“This requirement prohibits law enforcement from engaging in general or exploratory searches.”

respectively, in support of these arguments.

We heed statements that might inflame or prejudice jurors “[w]hen credibility is a central issue.” Id.; (“[T]he state may discuss the victim’s life if it does not attempt to influence the jury’s prejudice or passion.”).

The supreme court has concluded than an attorney who used the phrase “I submit” in closing argument “was offering an interpretation of the evidence rather than a personal opinion.”

A prosecutor does not vouch for a witness’s credibility if the prosecutor “offer[s] an interpretation of the evidence 15 rather than a personal opinion as to guilt.”

See, -94 (Minn. 2000) (holding that district court erred by admitting non-testifying expert 10 statements that were inadmissible hearsay and “improper expert testimony”); (“The admission of expert testimony is within the broad discretion accorded a tri

Bakdash’s negligent driving conduct does not necessarily “preclude the possibility that a higher level of intent may be present.”

The particularity clause prevents “general or exploratory” searches, and “prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another,” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S. Ct. 74, 76 (1927).

“This requirement prohibits law enforcement from engaging in general or exploratory searches.”

order on a motion to suppress, we review “the district court’s factual findings under our clearly erroneous standard,” and the “legal determinations, including a determination of probable cause, de novo.” (emphasis added) ( (“This court affords great deference to an issuing judge’s findings of fact, which we will reverse only if clearly erroneous.

On review, we must “determine whether there was a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed.”

7 Generally, a prosecutor “may not offer a personal opinion as to the defendant’s guilt” but may “offer[] an interpretation of the evidence.” d 782, 799 (Minn. 2000).

See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989)

We review whether there is a “substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed,” and, under the totality of the circumstances, are “careful not to review each component of the affidavit in isolation,” Wiley, d at 268.

20 (noting that the cumulative nature of the evidence is relevant to determining whether the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

“An expert opinion is helpful if the members of the jury, having the knowledge and general experience common to every member of the community, would be aided in the consideration of the issues by the offered testimony.” (quotation omitted).