Cited by

(analyzing whether the state could prove an element of a charge in a particular way de novo because the construction of a criminal statute is a question of law).

(stating that “[a]ppellate courts have no .

State v. Colvin , 4 (Minn. 2002) .

See State v. Colvin , (stating that “[a]ppellate courts have no .

“For a burglary conviction to stand, the state must prove that a defendant intended to commit some independent crime other than trespass.” State v. Colvin , (“[T]he state has to do more than establish an intent to commit the crime of trespass in order to obtain a burglary conviction or a conviction of possessing burglary tools.

3 We observe that although trespass is an element of third-degree burglary , Minnesota caselaw holds that trespass is not sufficient to sustain a burglary conviction because “the state must prove that a defendant intended to commit some independent crime other than trespass.” Minn. Stat. § 609.582 (2016).

.”); (“For a burglary conviction to stand, the state must prove that a defendant intended to commit some independent crime other than trespass.”).

See Andersen, d at 327 (adopting federal court s’ reasoning that “ the issue of whether an affiant deliberately made statements that were false or in reckless disregard of the truth involves a fact-based question”); (“Appellate courts have no .

d not have consent to enter D.J.J.’ s home because “the domestic abuse no -contact order issued against him made his entry into the victim’s residence unlawful, whether she purported to consent to the entry or not.” The state relies on State v. Colvin, in which the supreme court stated that “violation of the no - entry provision of an OFP satis f[ies] the illegal entry element of burglary.” d 449, 454 (Minn. 2002).

(concluding violation of no-entry provision of an order for protection establishes the illegal entry element of burglary but cannot satisfy the independent crime requ irement).

In State v. Colvin, the supreme court held that a violation of a no-entry provisi on of an order for protection (OFP) is “excluded fro m the crimes that can be the b ases for the independent crime element of burglary.” 7

See Michaels v. First USA Title, LLC, (“Because we are not a fact-finding court, issues brought to us on review must have been identified, argued fully, and entered into the record at the district court level.”) ; see also State v. Colvin , (stating that appellate courts “have no .

State v. Colvin , , 452 (Minn. 2002).

-52 (Minn. 2002) (reviewing de novo whether the appellant’s intent to violate an OFP fulfills the intent requirement in the burglary statute).

6 See, e.g. , State v. Jones , (defendant violated OFP by sending frightening text messages); State v. Beaty , (defendant violated OFP by sending a letter to the victim threatening her life); (defendant violated OFP by entering the victim’s home without her knowledge or consent); State v. Rocha, No. A11-27 (Minn. App. Apr.

Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if there is reasonable evidence to support them.” (citations omitted).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has noted that the statute only prohibited violating an OFP if “a valid OFP existed, and [the] defendant knew of [the OFP].” n.1 (Minn. 2002).

“Construction of a criminal statute is a question of law subject to de novo review.”

The district court, however, must vacate judgment on a post-verdict motion of a defendant under rule 26.04, subdivision 3, when the “document does not charge an offense, or if the court did not have jurisdiction over the offense charged.” (holding that judgment must be vacated when stipulated facts fail to establish the legal basis required for a burglary charge).

t’s conduct is prohibited by the statute he is charged under is an issue of statutory interpretation that this court reviews de novo.” (concluding that the defendant’s threat to assault the victim with a knife if he did not comply with the demand for money constituted a threat under the terroristic-threats statute) (), review denied (Minn. Mar.

(“Appellate courts have no .

Dunlap argues that the admitted facts do not support his plea

(“[A]ppellate courts have no .