Cited by

See Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471 (1963)

reasonable”); (considering, as part of exigent-circumstances analysis, whether “peaceable entry was made” and whether injury was prevented); Lohnes, d at 612 (noting that “entry to defendant’s abode was peaceable”); see also Lange, 594 U.S. at 301 (stating that “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth A

9 (quotation marks omitted).

(citing Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C.

In Minnesota, police officers are encouraged “to obtain arrest warrants whenever possible.” 5 (Minn. 1990) (quotation omitted).

A defendant’s burden is satisfied if they have presented “sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found [the] defendant acted in self-defense.” –58 (Minn. 1990); see also Johnson, –32 (holding that the defendant “met [their] burden of coming forward with evidence to support each element of [their] claim of self-defense” after concluding there was evidence to support the reasonable conclusion that each element of self-defense was met).

Exigent circumstances can be establ ished either by a single factor or “totality of the circumstances.”

5 not a “single-factor exigent circumstance.” See, e.g., State v. Shriner , (“We have described the test for single-factor exigent circumstances as one in which the existence of one fact alone creates exigent circ umstances.” (quotation omitted)); (explaining that “in certain situations a single factor alone can create exigent circumstances”).

See, (“The jury could reasonably have found this to be an execution-type killing, which is a clear example of premeditated murder.”).

“A warrantless arrest by police in a home or similar area in which a suspect has a privacy interest is per se unreasonable unless exigent circumstances exist.” -56 (Minn. 1990).

(if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt the nonexistence of any of the elements, a defendant cannot prevail on a self -defense claim).

See State v. Gray , , 259 (Minn. 1990) ("[A]n execution-type killing ...

See State v. Gray , , 256 (Minn. 1990).

d 251, 256 (Minn. 1990).

District courts “are afforded broad discretion and 13 considerable latitude in choosing the language of jury instructions.” Smith, d at 400 ( ).

.”); d 251, 255 (Minn. 1990) (stating that “defendant clearly had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the motel room, which is necessary for a protectible fourth amendment interest”).

Two fact patterns give rise to the exigent circumstances exception: “(1) a situation in which a single matter, such as a fleeing felon or danger to persons or evidence, is highly compelling; and (2) ‘a totality of the circumstances’ situation.” Hummel, d at 72 ( cert.

(establishing a single-factor test for exigent circumstances); (recognizing “imminent destruction of evidence” as a factor that may support an exigent- circumstances finding).

District courts have considerable latitude in the selection of the exact language of the instructions, and instructions will be reviewed as a whole to determine if they fairly and adequately explain the law

(quoting State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242, 254 , ).

Exigent circumstances can be established either by a single factor or by the “totality of the circumstances.” State *587 v. Gray

“The U.S. Supreme Court has not adopted a definite test for determining when exigent circumstances exist.”

See, e.g., Thompson, d at 12-3 (declining to reduce murder to manslaughter on theory of imperfect self-defense); (stating that evidence suggesting the victim at times may have had the upper hand in the struggle with the initial aggressor was not a *413 legally sufficient withdrawal); -33 (Minn.1989) (holding that short break in armed trespasser's otherwise continuous stream