Cited by

But to establish a violation of that right

9 Fravel also contends that the expert’s testimony amounted to impermissible propensity evidence of Fravel’s character, citing to our cases on eliciting impermissible character evidence, including testimony that the defendant fit a drug courier profile ( 548 (Minn. 1994)), testimony that the defendant possessed pornographic images (), and the prosecutor’s inflammatory descriptions of the defendant ().

A prosecuting attorney is “not free to urge the jurors to put themselves in the defendant’s shoes,” and it is “improper for the prosecutor to urge the jurors to look at their own experiences as proof that the defendant’s defense is not credible.”

548 (Minn. 1994); 63-64 (Minn. 1981) (holding that expert evidence about “battering parent syndrome” should not have been admitted during the defendant’s trial for the third-degree murder of his baby because, although the expert “did not testify that [the defendan

5 The district court analyzed Weeks’s

hite powdery substance; (13) inside Djam’s carry-on roller bag, the detective found identical, but empty, blue bags with the “Yummy” label; (14) the white powdery substance tested positive for cocaine; (15) the white powdery substance weighed approximately 47.658 3

The officer stated, with surprise, that it was a “big freaking rock,” used the term “dealing bags,” commented on “stuff” being “stashed” in loose car panels, and affirmed that it was a “big bust.” (explaining that “evidence that a defendant has traits shared by those who in the past have acted as drug couriers ” is akin to inadmissible character evidence).

the district court determined that Boswell failed to meet his burden to prove that underrepresentation in the panel of potential jurors “was the result of a systematic exclusion of the group in question from the jury selection process.” We discern no error in the district court’s determination.

Profile evidence may be inadmissible if “the unfair prejudice to the defendant outweighs the probative value of the evidence.” d 452, 466 (Minn. 2024) (citing State v. Williams , -49 (Minn. 1994)).

But during closing argument a prosecutor may appeal to jurors’ common sense, aff’d on other grounds , if the prosecutor does not improperly “urge the jurors to look at their own experiences as proof 12 that the defendant’s defense is not credible ,”

Generally, a prosecutor may not “urge the jurors to put themselves in the defendant’s shoes.”

6 a criminal defendant a jury of a particular composition or one that mirrors the community.”

–49 (Minn. 1994) (holding that drug courier profile evidence was not admissible and distinguishing the use of such profile evidence in police investigations from its use in court proceedings); (holding that “battering parent” profile evidence is inadmissible).

“The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a jury pool that reflects a fair cross-section of the community.”6 see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)

But neither federal nor state constitutional law “guarantee[s] a criminal defendant a jury of a particular composition or one that mirrors the community.”

the supreme court applied the prosecutorial-misconduct standard where, for the first time on appeal, the appellant argued that the prosecuting attorney elicited testimony “that defendant fit a so-called ‘drug courier profile.’” Because Pike contends that the expert testimony was also improper pr

Nevertheless, “a police officer testifying in a criminal case may not, under the guise of explaining how [the] investigation focused on defendant, relate hearsay statements of others.” (alteration in original) (); -25 (Minn. 1984) (“[E]ven a limited elicitation, for nonhearsay purposes, of general testimony that a tip had been received that led to defendant’s prints being compared

But neither federal nor state 7 constitutional law “guarantee[s] a criminal defendant a jury of a particular composition or one that mirrors the community.”

rongest evidence of guilt does not eliminate a defendant’s right to a fair trial”); –55 (Minn. 1994) (noting that “[t]he prosecutor had a strong case,” but “it [was] not clear to us whether the jury found Harris guilty because of the relevant evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, or because of inadmissible evidence and innuendo”); (reversing the defendant’s conviction although “there undoubtedly was sufficient admissible evidence on which to base the verdict of guilty” because prosecutor

See Vue, d at 723 (holding that any probative value from expert testimony was improperly “based on generalizations that appellant is part of a ‘guilty class’ of spouse-abusers, and the victim is part of a ‘victim class’ of abused women”); d 538, 548 (Minn. 1994) (holding that evidence was inadmissible when officers testified that drug couriers act in a specific way and the jury was encouraged to infer that defendant was a drug courier because she fit the profile).

(noting that a prosecutor’s claim that 4 the offered defense is commonly employed when nothing else will work is disparaging to the defense); -49 (Minn. 1994) (noting it is inappropriate to belittle the defense by suggesting that the defense is “the only defense that might work” (quotation marks omitted)).

But “[t]he Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a criminal defendant a jury of a particular composition or one that mirrors the community.” (explaining that the fair-cross-section-of-the-community requirement is limited and does not guarantee a defendant will receive a jury of a particular racial composition or one that mirrors the racial makeup of the community).

-48 (Minn. 1994) (stating that such evidence “seems akin to character evidence” (quotation omitted)).

For consistency, we use the term “jury panel.” 4 guarantee a criminal defendant a jury of a particular composition or one that mirrors the community.”

But the “Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a criminal defendant a jury of a particular composition or one that mirrors the com munity.”

(concluding 18 that the prosecution disparaged the defense by using the language “[w]hat kind of defense could you raise in a drug case” which improperly invited the jurors to speculate about the motivation behind the defendant’s decision to try the case a certain way); State v. Bettin, 244 N.W.

While neither party discussed this issue, “an appellate court has a ‘responsibility to review the record even though the assignments of error are inadequate.’” ().

and Bustos, d at 665, to support his request for relief under the cumulative-error standard.

n to claim that “it is everybody else’s fault.” Lucas argues that the district court improperly admitted the expert’s testimony because it was akin to improper character evidence that impermissibly “invited the jury to infer that, because Lucas’s conduct fit the profile of a male domestic abuser, then Lucas must be a domestic abuser.” To support his position

“[A]ttempting to elic it or actually eliciting clearly inadmissible evidence may constitute misconduct.” Fields, d at 782 (-45, 549 (Minn. 1994)).