Cited by

“[T]here must be specific facts to establish a direct connection between the alleged criminal activity and the site to be searched.”

8 It is true that appellate courts’ “consider ation [of probable cause ] is limited to the information presented in the affidavit, rather than to the information actually possessed by the police.”

“[T]here must 11 be specific facts to establish a direct connection between the alleged criminal activity and the site to be searched.” State v. Souto

(quoting State v. Souto , , 747 (Minn. 1998) ); see also, e.g. , Massachusetts v. Upton , 466 U.S. 727 , 732-33, 104 S.Ct.

Although Shivers does not explicitly argue that the search war rant failed to establish a nexus between drug activity and his residence

State v. Souto , -48 (Minn. 1998).

t he court reasoned that the “evidence obtained from the garbage pull [did] not rise to the level of ongoing criminal activity.” The court also noted that “drugs are disposable”; that the “evidence obtained .

In determining whether a sufficient nexus exists, “information linking the crime to the place to be searched and the freshness of the inf ormation” are relevant factors, as well as “[t] he reliability of the source of the information .”

“Factors relating to staleness include whether there is any indication of ongoing criminal activity, whether the 6 articles sought are innocuous or incriminating, whether the property sought is easily disposable or transferable, and whether the items sought are of enduring utility.” .

462 U.S. at 238 -39, 103 S. Ct. at 2332 (quotation omitted) ; see also State v. Souto , (applying Gates).

8 See State v. Souto , (concluding that because information in a search warrant was stale, the w arrant lacked probable cause).

(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 6 2317, 2332 (1983)).

’” (quoting Sgro v. United States , 287 U.S. 206, 210, 53 S. Ct. 138, 140 (1932)).

(vacating a conviction where evidence should have been suppressed).

(ordering conviction be vacated where evidence should have been suppressed).

Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1650 (1967); Yarbrough, d at 622; -48 (Minn. 1998).

al” who used the property described by the CI as a “stash house.” 7 Freshness of information Flores also argues that the search wa rrant was not supported by probable cause because “the information wa s not sufficiently fresh.” “E lements bearing on [probable cause] include information linking the crime to the place to be searched and the freshness of the information.”

“Factors relating to staleness include whether there is any indication of ongoing criminal activity, whether the articles sought are innocuous or incriminating, whether the property sought is easily disposable or transferable, and whether the items sought are of enduring utility.”

The warrant application and supporting affidavit must include “specific facts to establish a direct connection between the alleged criminal activity and the site to be searched.”

Finally, citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983), appellant argues that, even if the tip was reliable, the dog sniff outside his apartment was impermissible because the informant only reported that appellant had marijuana in his garage, not in his apartment.

“Elements bearing on this probability determination include information establishing a nexus between the crime, objects to be seized and the place to be searched.” Jenkins, d at 223 ( and 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 3.7(d) (4th ed. 2004)).

–48 (Minn. 1998) (“This court has historically required a direct connection, or nexus, between the alleged crime and the particular place to be searched, particularly in cases involving the search of a residence for evidence of drug activity.”).

“In determining probable cause, the [judge] must consider the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information.” 750 (Minn. 1998) (quotations omitted).

-49 (Minn. 1998) (reversing conviction based on evidence obtained during search for which the warrant lacked probable cause).

in which the supreme court concluded that there was an insufficient nexus between the appellant’s 7 suspected drug-trafficking and her residence.

whether the property sought is easily disposable or transferable, and whether the items sought are of enduring utility.”