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And the two Minnesota Supreme Court cases from which Calmes, d at 644–45, derived the crystallized-expectation-of-finality due- process standard—Humes, d at 317, n.6 (Minn. 2016)—each dealt with subject-matter jurisdiction as a separate question from due process and double jeopardy, applying the crystallized-expectation-of-finality standard only in the latter analysis.

(stating that, when applying a prior version of the statute, the terms of conditional-release statute are “mandatory and nonwaivable”).

CS-2 753-54, or omits a required conditional-release term

wn, d at 672-73, 75 (Minn. 2000) (affirming modification of sentence that imposed a period of conditional release that was not included in the plea petition and was not imposed at the initial sentencing hearing because the additional period of conditional release did not extend Brown’s sentence beyond the period of time contemplated in the plea petition); - 82 (Minn. 1998) (holding that m andatory periods of conditional release cannot be waived, but allowing Garcia the option to withdraw his ple

See, e.g., Reynolds, d at 130

State v. Garcia , -82 (Minn. 1998).

20, 2012); (holding that “there is no constitutional right to specific performance of a plea agreemen t”).

In State v. Garcia, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that an unqualified promis e induced the defendant’s plea and remanded 5 to the district court to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea “if he so chooses.” -82 (Minn. 1998).

Kendricks’s reliance on James v. State , 730 (Minn. 2005), d 879, 882 (Minn. 1998), is misplaced.

9.6 For the above reasons, we reverse the 6

at 481-82; (recognizing that if a court corrects a sentence that was part of a plea agreement, the defendant “must be allowed to withdraw from the plea agreement if he so chooses”).

Nothing in the record supports Hoshal’s assertion that he pleaded “with the expectation that he would receive no more than the presumptive guidelines range.” (holding that where the specific sentence promised by the prosecution did not include the mandatory conditional-release term, the promise was unauthorized by law and the defendant must be allowed to withdraw the plea).

- 82 (Minn. 1998) (declining to grant defendant specific performance of plea agreement when it included terms that district court had no authority to impose in first place).

(“If the court rejects the plea agreement, it must advise the parties in open court and then call upon the defen *481 dant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.”); (recognizing that if a court corrects a sentence that was part of a plea agreement, the defendant “must be allowed to withdraw from, the plea agreement if he so chooses”).

See, e.g., James, d at 725-26, 730; 526-29 (Minn. 2003); -45 (Minn. 2000); -82 (Minn. 1998).

Six months after Humes, d 879 (Minn. 1998).

d 517, 527 (Minn. 2003) (holding that plea withdrawal should be the first option, but if the state would be unduly prejudiced by withdrawal, the district court may modify the sentence); (remanding for the district court to either allow appellant to withdraw his plea or to modify his sentence to the agreed-upon sentence); (holding that appellant must be allowed to withdraw from the plea agreement if he so chooses, but if he does not so choose, the sentence should be amended to not exceed the agre

See, (discussing due process limitations on court’s ability to correct sentence when defendant claims to have “crystallized expectation of finality” in originally imposed sentence); (same); Humes, d at 320-21 (same).

See, (offender’s motion); -77 (Minn.2011) (offender’s motion); (state’s motion).

where the supreme court held that the defendant was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because the district court imposed a sentence that was contrary to an essential term of his plea agreement.

-20 (Minn.2003); -73 (Minn.2000)

In the petition, he had an absolute right to either have his sentence modified or be allowed to withdraw his plea because the conditional release term was not included in his original plea agreement.