Cited by

(explaining that a prosecutor may identify circumstances corroborating witness testimony when arguing for credibility).

(stating that vouching occurs “when the government implies a guarantee of a witness’ s truthfulness, refers to facts outside the record, or expresses a personal opinion as to a witness’s credibility”).

attacked his character during closing argument by stating that “he will lie to people to get what he wants.” The supreme court has explained that “[a]n advocate may indeed point to 9 circumstances which cast doubt on a witness’ s veracity or which corroborates his or her testimony, but he may not throw onto the scales of credibility the weight of his own personal opinion.”

It is prosecutorial misconduct to bolster the credibility of the state’s witnesses with the prosecutor’s own opinion: an advocate “may not throw onto the scales of credibility the weight of his own personal opinion.”

(“The fact that defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s statements suggests he then did not consider them prejudicial.”).

Conduct 3.4(e); (stating in the criminal context that an attorney may not interject personal opinions at trial regarding the veracity of a witness).

Cox II, d at 54 2–43 (citing Spann v. State , –74 (Minn. 2007)); see also Reese, d at 743 ( ).

Credibility of a witness is “to be determined by the jury.” d 502, 516 (Minn. 1984).

on the basis of the same act.” (same).

d 502, 516 (Minn. 1984).

While prosecutors may show circumstances which either substantiate or cast doubt on a witness’s veracity during closing arguments, they may not “throw onto the scales of credibility the weight of [their] own personal opinion.”

(“An advocate may indeed point to circumstances which cast doubt on a witness ’ veracity or which corroborates his or her testimony, but he may not throw onto the scales of credibility the weight of his own personal opinion.”).

supreme court held that the prosecutor’s expression of a personal opinion of the accused’ s guilt or the veracity of witnesses was harmless when the district court “cautioned the jury that it should consider only the evidence and that c ounsel’s final argument statements were not evidence, where the evidence of guilt was ade quate, and where the prosecutor’ s argument was otherwise proper.”

16, 2001); (“ an advocate may .

See Sanderson, d at 226–27 (stating that appellant did not receive ineffective assistance because he failed to show that the verdict would have been different if his attorney objected during closing argument); (stating that objectionable comments did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct 9 because they were isolated and made during a lengthy argument).

ce, a 12 prosecutor’s error is mitigated by the issuance of proper jury instructions when “the trial judge cautioned the jury that it should consider only the evidence and that counsel’s final argument statements were not evidence, where the evidence of guilt was adequate, and where the prosecutor’s argument was otherwise proper.”

That is, counsel may “point to circumstances which cast doubt on a witness’ veracity or which corroborates his or her testimony, but he may not throw onto the scales of credibility the weight of his own personal opinion.”

While a prosecutor “may not throw onto the scales of credibility the weight of [her] own personal opinion,” she “may argue that particular witnesses were or were not credible,” Lopez-Rios, d at 614.

d at 889; (concluding that “portions of the final argument of the prosecutor endorsing the credibility of the state's witnesses and injecting personal opinion as to defendant’s credibility were clearly improper”).