Cited by

Second, we must “determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Silvernail, d at 599 (quotation omitted); (“[F]or a conviction requiring specific intent to stand, such intent must be the only reasonable inference when the evidence as a whole is viewed in the light most favorable to the state.”).

may in most cases be proven only by circumstantial evidence,” rev. denied (Minn. 2 –66 (Minn. 1999) (citing Minn. Stat. § 169.13, subd.

Second, we must “determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Silvernail, d at 599 (citation omitted); (“[F]or a conviction requiring specific intent to stand, such intent must be the only reasonable inference when the evidence as a whole is viewed in the light most favorable to the state.”).

(“An action is done ‘repeatedly’ when it is done ‘again and again.’”); (defining “repeatedly” in Minnesota Statutes section 609.749, subdivision 2(6) (1996), as “more than once”), rev. denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

Second, this court has determined that as used in the harassment statute, “‘repeatedly’ means ‘more than once.’” (emphasis added), rev. denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

We then “ determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Loving, d at 643 (quotation omitted); (“[F]or a conviction requiring specific intent to stand, such intent must be the only reasonable inference when the evidence as a whole is viewed in the light most favorable to the state.”), rev. denied (Minn. 6 July 16, 1998).

Porte emphasizes that witness tampering is a crime of specific intent—“an intent to cause a particular result.” d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted); (“[A]n attempt to commit any crime requires a specific intent to commit that particular offense.” (quotation omitted)); (“[T]he word ‘intentionally’ makes witness tampering a specific[-]intent offense.” (quotation omitted)) , rev. denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

Guidelines II.F (2000); rev. denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998), for the proposition that Noor was not b inding precedent because there was a possibility of further appellate review in Noor’s case.

Witness tampering is an offense that requires “specific intent.” State v. Collins , review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

Second, the stalking-by-mail statute and the stalking-by-telephone statute both require the conduct to be done “repeatedly,” defined as “occurring again and again.” American Heritage, supra at 1489; (defining repeatedly as “more than once” in Minn. Stat. § 609.749), review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

(“This court’s decisions do not have precedential effect until the deadline for granting review has expired.”), review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary , supra , at 991; see State v. Collins , , 42 (Minn. App. 1998) (defining the word "repeatedly" in Minn. Stat. § 609.749 , subd.

See S tate v. Collins , (this court’s opinion is not binding precedent if the supreme court grants review and does not affirm), review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

The state cites State v. Collins , review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998), to support its position that appellant cannot challenge the admission of re ferences to his prior crimes.

“The inte nt inquiry is made under an objective standard.” State v. Collins , (quotation omitted) , review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

Even though decisions of the court of appeals “do not have precedential effect until the deadline for granting review has expired,” review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998) , this court typically follows the rule of law announced in a published opinion, even one subject to further review, until the Minnesota Supreme Court announces a different rule of law.

For this argument, review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998), but we believe she misconstrues its language.

“[F]or purposes of section 609.749, subdivision 2(6), repeatedly means more than once.” (quotation marks omitted), review denied (Minn. Jul.

review denied (Minn. July 16, 1988).

Intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence, but “such intent must be the only reasonable inference when the evidence as a whole is viewed in the light most favorable to the state.” review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

We do not rely on Pollard because our decisions are not binding until the deadline for granting review by the supreme court has expired, review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998), and because of slight differentiations in the circumstances.

21, 2014); review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

(stating that an ambiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of leniency to the defendant), review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

(explaining that an opinion of this court has precedential effect once the deadline for granting review has expired), review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

(noting that parallels between existing criminal statutes requiring specific intent and stalking statute “militate toward finding that the stalking statute also requires specific intent”), review denied (Minn. July 16,1998).

review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

§ 645.16 (stating where words of law are clear and free from ambiguity, courts shall not disregard letter of law under pretext of pursuing spirit); (stating rule of lenity is to ensure that criminal statutes provide fair warning concerning illegal conduct), review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

“A statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.” review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998) (quotation omitted).

review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).

review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).