Cited by

Cf., n.2 (Minn. 2001) (“[A] prosecutor’s attempts to shift the burden of proof are often nonprejudicial and harmless where .

When a defendant seeks to invalidate a warrant, the Franks 1 test requires a defendant to show that (1) the affiant “deliberately made a statement that was false or in reckless disregard of the truth,” and (2) “the statement was material to the probable cause determination.”

See, n.2 (Minn. 2001) (concluding prosecuting attorney’s attempts to shift the burden of proof are often harmless when “the district court clearly and thoroughly instructed the jury regarding the burden of proof”).

(explaining that state’s intentional release of the motor vehicle in which the victims were killed did not violate defendant’s right to due process because defendant failed to show that the eviden ce had exculpatory value).

Following Franks, courts require the defendant to bear the burden of proving both parts of the following two -prong t est: (1) that the affiant “deliberately made a statement that was false or in reckless disregard of the truth,” and (2) that “the statement was material to the probable cause determination.” (d 373, 390 (Minn. 2001)).

n.2 (Minn. 2001) (“[A] prosecutor’s attempts to shift the burden of proof are often nonprejudicial and harmless where .

Accordingly, if a defendant seeks to invalidate a warrant under Franks, the defendant must show that “(1) the affiant ‘deliberately made a statement 15 that was false or in reckless disregard of the truth,’ and (2) ‘the statement was material to the probable cause determination.’” ().

Hannon , d at 807 (quoting State v. McDonough , , 384 (Minn. 2001) ).

the district court clearly and thoroughly instructed the jury regarding the burden of proof.” n.2 (Minn. 2001).

Accordingly, if a defendant seeks to invalidate a warrant under Franks, the defendant must show that “(1) the affiant ‘deliberately made a statement that was false or in reckless disregard of the truth, ’ and (2) ‘the statement was material to the probable cause determination.’” ().

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676 (1978)

“[A] prosecutor’s attempts to shift the burden of proof are often nonprejudicial and harmless where, as here, the district court clearly and thoroughly instructed the jury regarding the burden of proof.” n.2 (Minn. 2001).

With respect to Onyelobi’s second contention, it is true that if a question asked by a prosecutor would “elicit[] the same response[] from any fair-minded person,” only asking this question of jurors of a particular race and then striking them based on their reasonable answer would “not [be] race neutral.” ().

See, e.g., Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 52, 109 S. Ct. at 334 (semen samples); Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 481, 104 S. Ct. at 2530 (breath samples); -36 (Minn. 2010) (GPS data from taxicab, wallet, pair of shoes, car, pants, blood evidence on gun, biological material on bullets and bullet fragments); (car, information recorded in caller ID box).

The burden of proof rests upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.” n.2 (Minn. 2001) (illustrating that, where the district court clearly and comprehensively instructed the jury regarding the burden of proof, attempts to shift the burden of proof are often nonprejudicial).

see Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S. Ct. at 1723-24; see also Minn. R. Crim.

Additionally, “a prosecutor’s attempts to shift the burden of proof are often nonprejudicial and harmless where, as here, the district court clearly and thoroughly instructed the jury regarding the burden of proof.” n.2 (Minn. 2001).

See Martin, d at 103–04 (rejecting Batson challenge and distinguishing McRae, in part, because the district court properly performed Batson analysis); –86 (Minn. 2001) (rejecting Batson challenge, in part, because the jurors were all asked the same questions).

the district court clearly and thoroughly instructed the jury regarding the burden of proof.” d 373, 389 n.2 (Minn. 2001); (“[W]e presume that jurors follow the court’s instructions.”).

the district court clearly and thoroughly instructed the jury regarding the burden of proof.” n.2 (Minn. 2001).

The subject of a search “must show that the officer deliberately made a statement that was false or in reckless disregard of the truth, and that the statement was material to the probable cause determination.”

The district court also found that “[t]here’s nothing that [Pratt has] produced that would suggest in any way that the state has destroyed any exculpatory evidence.” When analyzing a destruction-of-evidence claim, “we consider whether the destruction was intentional and whether the exculpatory value of the lost or destroyed evidence was apparent and material.”

the district court clearly and thoroughly instructed the jury regarding the burden of proof.” n.2 (Minn. 2001).

When analyzing a destruction-of-evidence claim, appellate courts “consider whether the destruction was intentional and whether the exculpatory value of the lost or destroyed evidence was apparent and material.”