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and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights.” see Sammons v. Sammons , (stating that the “district court may not exercise jurisdiction over a nonparty” and “[lacked] personal jurisdiction to enter a judgment affecting [the property rights of a nonparty]”); (noting that Minn. Stat. § 518.58 (2000) “does not authorize the district court to adjudicate the interests of third parties”).

) (providing that failure to include “full name and date of birth” of defendant-tenant “does not deprive the court of jurisdiction” over eviction action); Real Est. Equity Strategies, LLC, d at 355-58 (holding that defendant-tenant’s 1 “The present statutory provisions for an eviction action replaced those that previously authorized an ‘unlawful detainer’ action.”

to seek to do so in [an] eviction action.” d 34, 40-41 (Minn. App. 2002).

oceeding, a district court lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights”); (stating that the “district court may not exercise jurisdiction over a nonparty” and “[lacked] personal jurisdiction to enter a judgment affecting [the property rights of a nonparty]”); (noting that Minn. Stat. § 518.58 “does not authorize the district court to adjudicate the interests of third parties”).

Therefore, according to Whitney, because Minnesota Statutes section 518.58 makes no mention of third-party creditors, the district court cannot “adjudicate the interests of third parties.”

ty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights.” see 7 (stating that the “district court may not exercise jurisdiction over a nonparty” and “[lacked] personal jurisdiction to enter a judgment affecting [the property rights of a nonparty]”); (noting that Minn. Stat. § 518.58, which provides for the division of marital property, “does not authorize the district court to adjudicate the interests of third parties”).

23, 2008); Real Estate Equity Strategies, - 59 (Minn. App. 2006); -41 (Minn. App. 2002); Amresco Residential Mortg.

9 We conclude that, viewing th e evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s 9 “[I]n a dissolution proceeding, a district court lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights.” d 335, 339 (Minn. App. 2006) ; (noting that section 518.58 “does not authorize th e district court to adjudicate t he interests of third parties”).

See Danielson v. Danielson , (recognizing that “in a dissolution proceeding, a district cour t lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights”); (noting that statutory authority providing for division of marital property in a marriage dissolution action “does not aut horize the district court to adjudicate the interests of third parties”).

Fraser v. Fraser , , 40 (Minn. App. 2002).

In Danielson v. Danielson , we recognized that “in a dissolution proceeding, a district court lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights.” see also Fraser v. Fraser , (noting that statutory authority providing for division of marital property in a marriage dissolution action “does not authorize the district court to adjudicate the interests of third parties”).

lacks personal jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights.” (noting that Minn. Stat § 518.58 (2000) “does not authorize the district cou rt to adjudicate the interests of third parties”).

(quoting Fraser v. Fraser , –41 (Minn. App. 2002)).

This court has noted that the summary nature of an eviction proceeding “is comparable to the summary nature of the former unlawful-detainer proceeding.”

-58 (stating that the summary nature of eviction proceedings remains even though district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to address title-related issues); -41 (Minn. App. 2001) (“[T]o the extent wife has the ability to litigate her equitable mortgage and other claims and defenses in alternate civil proceedings, it would be inappropriate for her to seek to do so in the eviction action.”).

-41 (Minn. App. 2002) (emphasis added).

See Dahlberg v. Young, 231 Minn. 60, 68, (explaining an eviction action “merely determines the right to present possession and does not adjudicate the ultimate legal or equitable rights of ownership”); (holding counterclaims and defenses should only be considered if eviction action provides the “only forum” for litigating those claims); AMRESCO Residential Mortg.

ourt’s “considerable discretion” to expand or to limit the scope of an eviction action); d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004) (“[A] right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies.” (quotation omitted)); -41 (Minn. App. 2002) (stating that challenges to real-property ownership should be brought in eviction action only if it is the sole forum for litigating such claims

We have only allowed counterclaims in an eviction action when “the eviction action presents the only forum for litigating these claims.”

W.2d 444, 444–46 (Minn. App. 2001) (affirming dismissal of counterclaims “related to the underlying mortgage foreclosure” because appellants could “raise their counterclaims and equitable defenses directly in [a] separate, district court proceeding” and, consequently, “there [was] no evident reason to interfere with the summary nature of eviction proceedings”), –41 (Minn. App. 2002) (“[T]o the extent wife has the ability to litigate her equitable mortgage and other claims and defenses in alterna

And the extremely narrow exception to this rule, available only when “the eviction action presents the only forum for litigating these claims,” does not apply here.

§ 566.05(a) (providing requirements for forcible-entry-and-unlawful-detainer summons and complaint); (noting that legislature “repeal[ed] the unlawful detainer provisions of chapter 566 and enacted] new provisions to be codified at chapter 504A” and later “repealed] chapter 504A and replaced] it with what is now codified at chapter 504B regarding ‘evictions’ ”).

-41 (Minn.App.2002) (holding that, if possible, equitable claims and defenses should be litigated in alternate civil action, rather than in summary eviction action); -46 (Minn.App.2001) (same).