Cited by

(nature of killing); (words and actions); , 332 (Minn. 1969) (deadly weapon).

But many acts have not amounted to sufficient provocation, including: a victim “reaching for a gun ,” a victim “grabb[ing] a knife” after a defendant “smacked” her, -07 (Minn. 1990); a victim “reach[ing] for a weapon after [a defendant] assaulted him,” Eason, d at 262, 265; and a victim ’s physical gesture “challenging [a defendant] to a fight,” State

from the idea that a person intends the natural consequences of [their] actions.” (d 315, 320 (Minn. 2003)).

“Intent can be inferred from the words and acts of the [defendant] before and after the incident, and from the idea that a person intends the natural consequences of his or her actions.”

“[I]ntent is a state of mind that is usually proved with circumstantial evidence.” (“Intent is .

See Stiles v. State , (concluding that intent can be inferred from “pointing a loaded gun at a person and firing”).

On the issue of intent, we have previously held that “pointing a loaded gun at a person and firing it is likely to cause death and leads to an inference of intent.”

by drawing inferences” from the evidence such as the victim’s reaction, the type of crime, the events surrounding the crime, the relationship between the defendant and the victim, the defendant’s words and actions, and “the idea that a person intends the natural consequences of his or her actions.” ); -37 (Minn. App. 2012) (victim’s reacti on is circumstantial evidence showing intent), rev. denied (Minn. Mar.

“Intent can be inferred from the words and acts of the [defendant] before and after the incident, and from the idea that a person intends the natural consequences of his or her actions.” d 315, 320 (Minn. 2003).

1982) (same); (same); (same); (same); (same), abrogated on other grounds, (same); d 315, 321–22 (Minn. 2003) (same); State v. Harris , , 850 (Minn. 2006) (same); Zumberge, d at 698 (same).

a “f -cking b -tch” evince s “an intent to be impolite, not to threaten.” When considering evidence of i ntent, we are guided by the principle that “a person intends the natural consequences of his or her actions.”

acts would provoke a defendant of ordinary self -control into acting in the heat of passion, contrasting Johnson, d at 628 (concluding that the victim’s act of shooting the defendant in the head would provoke a person of ordinary self -control into a heat of passion) with two cases that concluded there was not sufficient provocation for heat-of- passion defense : Stiles v. State , (victim’s act o f reaching for a gun when defendant was aggressor did not provoke heat of passion) and State v. Hale

(stating a heat -of-passion instruction is not warranted when a defendant was the aggressor).

1; see Stiles v. State , (“Two elements are necessary for an intentional killing to be mitigated to heat-of-passion manslaughter —the defendant must kill in the heat of passion and the provocation must have been sufficien t to induce a person of ordinary self -control under like circumstances.”).

(quoting Stiles v. State , , 321 (Minn. 2003) ).

(words and acts of shooter); (nature of the killing); (use of a deadly weapon).

" Stiles v. State , , 321 (Minn. 2003) (quoting Hanson , 286 Minn. at 329 , d at 614-15 ) (citation omitted).

(noting that “pointing a loaded gun at a person and firing it is likely to cause death, and leads to an inference of intent”).

(holding in an intentional murder case that "[ijntent can be inferred from the words and acts of the shooter before and after the incident”); (holding that intent may be proven circumstantially and "may be inferred from events occurring before and after

10 While a defendant’s denial of an intent to kill may defy credulity in some cases, see, e. g., -21 (Minn.2003) (holding that there was no rational basis for a jury to believe that the defendant did not act with intent to kill when the defendant shot the victim at close range three times, recock-ing his shotgun between each shot), here the evidence would have permitted a rational jury to find Harris guilty o

( Leinweber, 303 Minn. at 421-22 , d at 125-26 ).