Cited by

d 4 611 (Minn. 2016) (deemed dismissal of personal-injury action); (deemed dismissal of personal-injury action); & n.1 (Minn. 1988) (dismissal of breach-of-employment-contract and defamation action for failure to timely file “Note of Issue/Certificate of Readiness”).

-92 (Minn. 1988); see also Finden, d at 750.

Co. , (“Defendant acted with diligence upon learning of the oversight.”); see also Charson v. Temple Israel , (“Charson moved with ‘due diligence’ after receiving notice of the dismissal.”); (“[Client] hired another attorney a short time after discovering that nothing had been done and that judgment had been entered against her.”); Coller v. Guardian An

Relief is warranted where the movant satisfies four requirements: (1) a debatably meritorious claim; (2) a reasonable excuse for the movant’s failure or neglect to act; (3) that the movant “acted with due diligence” after learning of the error or omission; and (4) that “no substantial prejudice will result to the other party.” –92 (Minn. 1988) ().

“[E]ven in those cases where a court has held the neglect of a client’s attorney to be inexcusable, if such neglect has been purely that of counsel, ordinarily courts are loath to ‘punish’ the innocent client for the counsel’s neglect.” Cole, d at 638 ().

“[O]rdinarily, courts are loath to punish the innocent client for the counsel’s neglect.”

For example, even in cases where a district court concluded that counsel’s neglect was inexcusable, “if such neglect has been purely that of counsel, ordinarily courts are loath to ‘ punish’ the innocent clie nt for the counsel’s neglect.”

For instance, even in cases where a district court determined that counsel’s neglect was inexcusable, “if such neglect has been purely that of counsel, ordinarily courts are loath to punish the innocent client for the counsel’s neglect.”

Relying on Charson v. Temple Israel , (Mi nn.

Charson v. Temple Israel

Ordinarily, the existence of a reasonable defense must “be demonstrated by more than conclusory allegations in moving papers.” Charson v. Temple Israel

Co. , , 490-91 (Minn. 1997) ; Nelson v. Siebert , , 394-95 (Minn. 1988) ; Charson v. Temple Israel , , 491-92 (Minn. 1988) ; Conley v. Downing , , 40-41 (Minn. 1982).

P. 60.02, and a district court’s denial of such relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion

Generally, courts are “loath to ‘punish’ the innocent client for the counsel’s neglect” even when the neglect is “inexcusable.”

3 (no prejudice other than that resulting from delay, which does not establish prejudice); Riemer v. Zahn , (no prejudice when delay does not cause evidence to be affected or witnesses to be unavailable); (

Co. , ) ; see also Charson v. Temple Israel

P. 60.02(a); -20 (Minn. 2016); Cole, d at 637-38; Nelson v. Siebert

4 party.” –92 (Minn. 1988) (quoting Finden v. Klaas, 268 Minn. 268, 271, ).

at 620 (-92 (Minn.1988)).

-92 (Minn. 1988) (quoting Finden, 268 Minn. at 271, d at 750).

4 defense on the merits” or, as relevant here, a “debatably meritorious claim”; (2) a reasonable excuse for his or her failure or neglect to act; (3) that he or she “ ‘acted with due diligence’ ” after learning of the error or omission; and (4) that “ ‘no substantial prejudice will result to the other party.’ ” -92 (Minn. 1988) (quoting Finden, 268 Minn. at 271, d at 750).

“Rule 60.02 specifically provides that a trial court has discretionary power to grant relief, not only from the order but also from a final judgment.”

See, Hinz v. Northland Milk & Ice Cream Co., 237 Minn. 28, 30

Northland Temps., d at 402.

See, (granting relief from judgment where the client was not complicit in the negligence or wrongdoing of his attorney); (“A litigant is not to be penalized for the neglect or mistakes of his lawyer.

oncluded that appellant’s attorney’s “failure to remain apprised of developments in the court rules governing civil actions is not reasonable excuse for the failure to timely file the action and is not excusable neglect.” But when analyzing the second rule-60.02 factor, a district court must “scrutinize[] the client’s action apart from [the] attorney’s omissions.”

Moreover, “even in those cases where a court has held the neglect of a client’s attorney to be inexcusable, if such neglect has been purely that of counsel, ordinarily courts are loath to ‘punish’ the innocent client for the counsel’s neglect.” see also C & A Enters.

269 n. 3 (Minn. 1998) ("It is well-settled law that courts should not reach constitutional issues if matters can be resolved otherwise."); , 492-93 n. 7 (Minn.1988) (declining to reach due-process challenge to local rule providing for dismissal with prejudice because relief was granted under rule 60.02).