Cited by

“When the facts are not in dispute and the district court’s decision is a question of law, we ‘independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.’” ().

The protections of the Fourth Amendment are “personal right[s]” that may be invoked when an individual “personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched” and that “expectation is reasonable.” (emphasis added).

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (quotation omitted)

“Absent exigent circumstances and probable cause, or consent, a warrantless entry and search of a private residence is per se unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment.” (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 590).

See Leonard, d at 159 (protection from unreasonable hotel registry searches); (protecting the reasonable expectation of privacy of short-term social guests); Carter, d at 211 (protection from unreasonable dog sniffs of storage units); (protection from warrantless searches of fish houses); Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub.

See Carter, d at 209, 211 (holding that a dog sniff outside a storage unit is a search under Article I, Section 10, though it is not a search under the Fourth Amendment); (holding that short-term social guests have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a home under Article I, Section 10, though there is no such expectation under the Fourth Amendment).

d 565, 579 (Minn. 2003).

IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10

IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10

ave or violent offense is involved; (b) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (c) whether there is strong probable cause connecting the suspect to the offense; (d) whether police have strong reason to believe the suspect is on the premises; (e) whether it is likely the suspect will escape if not swif tly apprehended; and (f ) whether peaceable entry was made.” (citation omitted).7 “The exigent circumstances analysis requires an objective evaluation of the facts reasonably avail

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49, 99 S. Ct. 421, 433 (1978); State v. Ortega , (declining to address whether a passenger had a reason able expectation of privacy in a car because it is not a jurisdictional question and the state did not c ontend that the defendant lacked such an expectation), aff’d, (Mi

(recognizing the reasonable privacy interest of “short-term social guest[s]”).

search of a private residence is per se unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment.” (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 , 100 S.Ct.

This same distinction applies to on which appellants rely to argue that Minnesota law provides greater protection for privacy in the home than federal law.

But in order to contest a search of property, “a defendant must establish a legitimate expectation of privacy relating to the area searched or the item[s] seized.” d 243, 249 (Minn. 2003) (alteration in original) (q uotation omitted); (determining that a defendant must show that 8 he or she personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable).

see also State v. Richards , (stating that an individual must establish a “legitimate expectation of privacy relating to the area searched 5 or the item seized” to invoke the Fourth Amendment’s protection).

When we interpret Article I, Section 10, we consider the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to be “of persuasive, although not compelling, authority.” ().

4 We begin by acknowledging that “[i]t is well-settled law that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their own homes.”

(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967)).

“A search occurs whenever governmental agents intrude upon an area where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.” (quotation omitted).

(“We view the dissent’s reasoning as being particularly persuasive.”); see also Jennie-O Foods, Inc. v. Safe-Glo Prods.

d 565, 571 (Minn. 2003).

Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub.

5 In its omnibus order, the district court relied primarily on

“All evidence obtained by illegal searches is inadmissible in court and the fruits of a warrantless entry made without probable cause and [an exception to the warrant 7 requirement] must be suppressed.” (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691 (1961)).

See, (dog sniff of storage unit is a search); (short-term social guests have a legitimate expectation of privacy); see also Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub.