Cited by

In addition, an investigative stop is appropriate if a law-enforcement officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person “was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985)

(“[Defendant] was under arrest from the time he was ordered to the ground at gunpoint, handcuffed, and put in the squad car.”).

(citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)).

In State v. Blacksten , , an officer stopped a vehicle driven by an armed-robbery suspect, “pointed a shotgun at him, ordered him to get out of the car and lie on the ground, .

State v. Blacksten , Munson, d at 137.

Id.; see also State v. Blacksten , (“Respondent was de facto under ar rest from the time he was ordered to the ground at gunpoint, handcuffed, and placed in the squad car.”).

See, e.g. , State v. Blacksten , , 846-47 (Minn. 1993) ; State v. Askerooth , , 371 (Minn. 2004) (Russell A. Anderson, J., concurring specially); see also United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675 , 683, 105 S. Ct. 1568 , 1573-574, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).

The supreme court has applied this test to determine whether an investigative detention developed into a “de facto” arrest on the ground that “the scope of the detention exceeded constitutional limits.” -47 (Minn. 1993) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985)).

(affirming conviction for second-degree intentional murder but, reducing defendant’s sentence in the interests of justice to that of second-degree felony murder); (reducing defendant’s sente

“Deference must be given to the district court’s credibility determinations.” (affirming district court when “trial judge heard the conflicting testimony, observed the witnesses, and chose to believe respondent”).

support the proposition that a reviewing court must look beyond conduct alone and see evidence of appellant’s purpose to kill or belief that appellant’s actions will result in death.

-47 (Minn.1993) (“Respondent was de facto under arrest from the time he was ordered to the ground at gunpoint, handcuffed, and placed in the squad car.”).

(reducing a sentence because the jury could have concluded that defendant merely aided the assault).

847 (Minn.1993) (stating that a 7-year-old conviction for robbery did not support probable cause for search in connection with current robbery).

at 135 ; (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 , 105 S.Ct.

(stating “detention of the person stopped may not continue indefinitely but only as long as reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop” (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-88 , 105 S.Ct.

Duration of the Stop “[T]he detention of [a] person stopped may not continue indefinitely but only as long as reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” (citation omitted).

An investigative detention following a lawful stop may last only “as long as reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” (citation omitted).

But we have previously held that where an illegal stop is involved, consent may still be valid if the consent was “manifestly voluntary.” aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, , 847 (Minn.1993).

(holding that the defendant “was de facto under arrest from the time he was ordered to the ground at gunpoint, handcuffed, and placed in the squad car.”).