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The determination of whether multiple offenses are part of a single course of conduct “depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”

One “purpose of this statute is ‘to limit punishment to a single sentence where a single behavioral incident result[s] in the violation of more than one criminal statute.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.035 advisory comm.

“Whether multiple offenses arose out of a single behavior[al] incident depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”

Thus, first -degree criminal sexual conduct requires the “general intent to sexually penetrate the victim.” State v. Bookwalter

(quotation omitted), and “depends on the facts and circumstances of [a] particular case.” ().

As we have previously recognized, generally, “if a defendant commits multiple offenses against the same victim during a single behavioral incident, Minn. Stat. § 609.035 provides that the defendant may be sentenced for only one of those offenses.”

see Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd.

In State v. Bookwalter, the defendant’s two offenses of criminal sexual conduct and attempted murder lacked a single criminal objective in part because the offenses required different criminal intents and were not part of “prearranged program of events.” -96 (Minn. 1995).

Subdivision 1 of Minn. Stat. § 609.035 provides that, “if a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses.” This prohibition against multiple punishments applies only if the multiple offenses arose out of “a single behavioral incident.” 3 (Minn. 1995); see Minn. Sent’g Guidelines cmt.

4 against multiple punishment applies only if the offenses arose out of “a single behavioral incident.”

(stating that first- degree criminal sexual conduct requires a showing of “the general intent to sexually penetrate the victim”).

This prohibition against multiple punishment applies only if the offenses arose out of “a single behavioral incident.” d 290, 294 (Minn. 1995).

This prohibition against multiple punishment applies only if the multiple offenses arose out of “a single behavioral incident.”

Under the avoidance -of- apprehension doctrine, a defendant cannot be subject to multiple punishment s or prosecutions when a second offense was committed “in an attempt to avoid apprehension for the first offense.”

The purpose of section 609.035 is “to limit punishment to a single sentence where a single behavioral incident result[s] in the violation of more than one criminal statute.” State v. Bookwalter , (alteration in original).

11(b) (2016); -96 (Minn. 1995) (concluding that first- degree sexual conduct is a general intent crime) .

First -degree criminal sexual conduct requires “the general intent to sexually penetrate the victim.” State v. Bookwalter

E.g., State v. Bookwalter , (holding that first -degree criminal sexual conduct and attempted murder were separate offenses and not part of a single behavioral incident even though both offenses were com mitted against the same victim and at locations less than two miles apart); State v. Stevenson , (Minn. 1

“[I]f a defendant commits multiple offenses against the same victim during a single behavioral 8 incident, Minn. Stat. § 609.035 provides that the defendant may be sentenced for only one of those offenses.”

The purpose of section 609.035 is “to limit punishment to a single sentence where a single behavioral incident result[s] in the violation of more than one criminal statute.” State v. Bookwalter , (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) .

d 290, 294 (Minn. 1995).

The purpose of section 609.035 is “to limit punishment to a single sentence where a single behavioral incident result[s] in the violation of more than one criminal statute.” State v. Bookwalter , (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1 (2016); see State v. Bookwalter , 4 (Minn. 1995) (stating tha t “the prohibition against multiple punishment contained in Minn. Stat. § 609.035 applies only if the multiple offenses arose out of a single behavioral incident”).

“Whether multiple offenses arose out of a single behavior incident depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”

A district court may impose multiple sentences “ if there were multiple victims, as long as the imposition of multiple sentences does not unfairly exag gerate the criminality of the defendant's conduct.”

“Whether multiple offenses arose out of a single behavior incident depen ds on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”

.”); -94 (Minn. 1995) (using the phrase “single behavioral incident” to explain the rule of section 609.035).

“Whether multiple offenses arose out of a single behavior[al] incident depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”

But “the essential ingredient” is “whether the segment of conduct involved was motivated by an effort to o btain a single criminal objective.” (quotation omitted) (emphasis omitted).

“Whether multiple offenses arose out of a single behavioral inc ident depends on the facts and circumstances of [a] particular case.” State v. Bookwalter

–86 (Minn. 1989); d 517, 521–22 (Minn. 1966).

See, e.g., Bakken, d at 270 -71; Bauer, d at 828 -31; State v. Bookwalter , -96 (Minn. 1995).

mit that crime.” 2 “For example, when arson is the means by which the defendant commits a murder, the defendant may not be sentenced both for the murder and for the arson, because the time and place of the o ffenses coincide and because the defendant is motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” State v. Bookwalter

at 302 ; see also State v. Bookwalter , , 296 (Minn. 1995) (stating that criminal sexual conduct in the first degree requires "the general intent to sexually penetrate the victim").

17 Criminal sexual conduct has been considered a separate behavioral incident when it was not part of “a single criminal objective” underlying multiple offenses, and it “was not a necessary prelude to any other crime.” State v. Bookwalter , -96 (Minn. 1995).