Cited by

12 See, (“Because the state failed to take advantage of its opportunity to build a factual record with respect to [a newly raised issue], we do not believe that resolution of the issue is necessary to the interests of justice.”).

And we have declined to extend the exception to scenarios in which officers rely “in good faith on the basis of a neutral magistrate’s authorization.” d 633, 639–40 (Minn. 2001).

(stating that “standing is a threshold issue”).

warrant application”); –40 (Minn. 2001) (applying the exclusionary rule despite law enforcement’s good-faith reliance on an issued warrant because it lacked the “sufficiently particularized circumstances” required to justify an unannounced entry).

[and] observed drug paraphernalia present.”); –36 (Minn. 2001) (reviewing no-knock entry on alleged “reason to believe [police] would find controlled substances and evidence of the sale and distribution of controlled substances”); Barnes, d at 808 (“[P]olice officers in Duluth were investigating a suspected drug selling operation.”).

(“ Because the state failed to take advantage of its opportunity to build a factual record with respect to standing, we do not believe that resolution of the standing issue is necessary to the interests of justice.”) ; see also Grunig, d at 137.

Appellant nonetheless argues that the search -warrant application is insufficient because neither the presence of drugs nor firearms alone can satisfy the reasonable - suspicion standard, 6 Appellant correctly cites caselaw holding that drugs alone do not provide re asonable suspicion to justify an unannounced entry.

8 To justify an unannounced entry, the “police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances , would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by , for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.” Garza v. State , (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

The district court, relying on Garza v. State , , 639 (Minn. 2001), and without discussing the four Dunn factors, determined that the fish house was not located on the curtilage of Shaw’s home because it was not “immediately and intimately connected to the home,” but rather “out back, behind the house and overgrown with grass.” In Garza, the Minnesota Supreme

(“ The good faith of the police cannot cure the absence of particularized circumstances in the warrant application justifying an unannounced entry.”).

But reasonable suspicion must be supported by “a particularized showing of dangerousness, futility, or likelihood of destruction of evidence.” see Garza v. State , (“[A] generalized showing of drug trafficking is not sufficient justification for an unannounced entry because evidence of drug trafficking does not, ipso facto, equate to a conclusion that an announced entry would be dangerous or futile, or that it would result in the destruction of evidence.”)

Stewart counters that “the State waived its opportunity to assert lack of standing, and the record in any event demonstrates standing.” The state may waive the issue of standing “by failing to raise it in an omnibus hearing in the [district] court.”

Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414-15 (2013); Milton, d at 799

Under Minnesota law, “police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile.” d 633, 638 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted).

aw enforcement officer; (3) express the purpose of the officer’s presence and the authority for the search or seizure; and (4) wait a reasonable time for the occupant to allow or refuse entry.” (describing the four components of the knock-and- 5 announce rule), aff’d in part, rev’d in part

“A dwelling’s curtilage is generally the area so immediately and intimately connected to the home that within it, a resident's reasonable expectation of privacy should be respected.”

-40 (Minn.2001); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 , 104 S.Ct.

Anim argues that the circumstances here are analogous to the no-knock provisions of search warrants that were struck down in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997), 2 In Richards, the United States Supreme Court examined a Wisconsin Supreme Court rule that “never required [officers] to knock and announce their presence when executing a search warrant in a felony drug investigation.” 520 U.S. at 387-88, 117 S. Ct. at 1418.

(concluding that “[b]ecause the state failed to take advantage of its opportunity to build a factual record with respect to [a newly raised issue], we do not believe that resolution of the issue is necessary to the interests of justice”).

(“A dwelling's curtilage is generally the area so immediately and intimately connected to the home that within it, a resident's reasonable expectation of privacy should be respected.”).

We concluded that such a remand was necessary in the “interests of justice,” notwithstanding our holding in Garza v. State that the state may waive “an argument that would otherwise support an order denying a motion to suppress evidence if the argument requires a factual record and the state failed to develop that record at the omnibus hearing.” Licari, d at 255 -56 (citing Garza, ).

638 n. 1 (Minn.2001) ("To the extent Lien can be understood to authorize an unannounced entry on a showing only that the premises were used for drug trafficking, it is overruled.”).

in arguing that the state should not be able to defend the district court’s decision on an alternative legal argument.