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-24 (Minn. App. 2023), rev. denied (Minn. July 18, 2023).

Kowbow, d at 750-51 (Minn. App. 1991)

Notwithstanding rule 412, “a [district] court has discretion to admit evidence tending to establish a source of knowledge of or familiarity with sexual matters in circumstances where the jury otherwise would likely infer that the defendant was the source of the knowledge.” see also Kroshus , d at 205 (“[E]vidence tending to establish a source of knowledge of or familiarity with sexual matters may be admitted in cases where 2 The district court did not address the “source of knowledge” exception

Even though rule 412 generally excludes evidence of a victim’s previous sexual conduct, the evidence may be admissible under an exception if “constitutionally required by the defendant’s right to due process, his right to confront his accusers, or his right to offer evidence in his own defense.”

6 of other kinds of evidence, the [district] court ought to balance the probative value of the evidence against its potential for causing unfair prejudice.”

And “[d]espite the prohibition of a rape-shield law or rule, a trial court has discretion to admit evidence tending to establish a source of knowledge of or familiarity with sexual matters 12 in circumstances where the jury otherwise would likely infer that the defendant was the source of the knowledge.”

Although a Schwartz hearing should be liberally granted, a district court need not hold one unless the party seeking review first establishes a prima facie case of juror misconduct or bias.

See Pulczinki, d at 535 (“proper remedy for teasing out potential juror bias during voir dire is for lawyers to ask probing questions of the juror”); (defense counsel failed to “ask the right question at voir dire to elicit [specific] information”); see also State v. Benedict , (concluding district court properly denied Schwartz hearing request because defendant failed to “ask the sort of clear question that, absent a lack of credibility on the juror’s part, necessarily would have elicited the d

Although a Schwartz hearing should be liberally granted, State v. Benedict , d 337, 339 (Minn. 1986), a district court need not hold one unless the party seeking review first establishes a prima facie case of juror misconduct or bias.

at 306 (); see also Friend, d at 545.

“[A] trial court has discretion to admit evidence te nding to establish a source of knowledge of or familiarity with sexual matters in circumstances where th e jury otherwise would likely infer that the defendant was the source of the knowledge.” State v. Benedict

Sexual -history evidence is also admissible when “constitutionally required by the defendant’s right to due process, his right to confront his accusers, or his right to offer evidence in his own defense.” Wenthe, d at 306 ().

See State v. Benedict , (noting that while the district court could have o rdered a Schwartz hearing, it was not an abuse of discretion for it to refuse to do so where the defendant failed to make a sufficient showing that the juror lied); Blatz v. Allina Health System , (noting tha

Courts may admit evidence of “a victim’s past sexual conduct[,] in all cases in which admission is constitutionally required by the defendant’s right to due process, his right to confront his accusers, or his right to offer evidence in his own defense.” State v. Benedict, 3

But, “[d]espite the prohibition of a rape -shield law or rule, a [district] court has discretion to admit evidence tending to establish a sou rce of knowledge of or familiarity with sexual matters in circumstances where the jury otherwise would likely infer that the defendant was the source of the knowledge.” State v. Benedict , .

But a defendant may introduce evidence of a victim’s prior sexual 10 conduct when “admission is constitutionally required by the defendant ’s right to due process, his right to confront his accusers, or his right to offer evidence in his own defense.”

Diaz relies on two cases to support his argument, review denied (Minn. Dec.

(“[A] [district] court has discretion to admit evidence tending to establish a source of knowledge of or familiarity with sexual matters in circumstances where the jury otherwise 10 would likely infer that the defendant was the source of the knowledge

We have construed the rape-shield law as allowing sexual-history evidence, however, when “admission is constitutionally required by the defendant’s right to due process, his right to confront his accusers, or his right to offer evidence in his own defense.” ().

Cobb also argues that the rape shield rule should have “yield[ed]” to his constitutional right to present a complete defense, d 337 (Minn. 1986)

Even if the rape-shield law would otherwise prevent it, evidence of a victim’s past sexual conduct may be admissible when excluding the evidence would infringe the defendant’s constitutional right “to due process, his right to confront his accusers, or his right to offer evidence in his own defense.”

“Despite the prohibition of a rape-shield law or rule, a trial court has discretion to admit evidence tending to establish a source of knowledge of or familiarity with sexual matters in circumstances where the jury otherwise would likely infer that the defendant was the source of the knowledge.” (“In certain cases the due process clause, the right to confront accusers, or the right to present evidence will require admission of evidence otherwise excluded by the rape shield law.”)

Minnesota appellate courts have recognized that this evidence is also admissible “in all cases in which admission is constitutionally required by the defendant’s right to due process, his right to confront his accusers, or his right to offer evidence in his own defense.”

It is not an abuse of discretion to deny a Schivartz hearing requested on the basis of a juror’s alleged dishonest answers in voir dire where “defense counsel did not ask the sort of clear question that, absent a lack of credibility on the juror’s part, necessarily would have elicited the disclosure of the sort of information that the [juror] withheld.”