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Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Hart, 477 N.W.2d 732.

47 citing documents.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
28, 2012); rev. denied (Minn. Jan.
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
1(a) does not contain a separate intent requirement, making it a general intent crime , (analyzing intent required for first -degree criminal sexual conduct in the context of erroneous jury instruction and concluding it is a general intent crime), rev. denied (Minn. Jan.
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2022
“Generally, failure to object at trial to the given jury instructions forfeits the right to appeal on that error.” rev. denied (Minn. Jan.
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2022
(concluding that presence of children in home was properly considered an aggravating factor because victim was attacked in her sons’ room while they were sleeping, and she was therefore “afraid to scream or struggle because her sons might awaken and be injured” and “afraid of leaving appellan
Nikita Nikel Dixon, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2021
The criminal sexual conduct statute “does not contain an intent requirement, making it a general intent crime.” rev. denied (Minn. Jan.
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
(“[T]hird degree criminal sexual conduct is an included offense of f irst degree criminal sexual conduct.”), review denied (Minn. Jan.
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
-39 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Jan.
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
d 732, 737-39 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Jan.
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
Grampre, d at 353; State v. Hart , , review denied (Minn. Jan.
Veterine Nicole McGhee, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
State v. Lagred 923 N.W.2d 345 Minn. Ct. App. 2019
State v. Lagred 923 N.W.2d 345 Minn. Ct. App. 2019
737 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Jan.
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
“[T]hird degree criminal sexual conduct is an included offense of first degree criminal sexual conduct.” , review denied (Minn. Jan.
State of Minnesota v. Charles Wesley Jones Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Charles Wesley Jones Minn. Ct. App. 2016
1(5); review denied (Minn. Jan.
State of Minnesota v. Sedne Bonitaz Williams Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Sedne Bonitaz Williams Minn. Ct. App. 2016
review denied (Minn. Jan.
State of Minnesota v. Thomas James Mitchell Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Thomas James Mitchell Minn. Ct. App. 2015
1(5); review denied (Minn. Jan.
State of Minnesota v. Javonate James McNeal Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Javonate James McNeal Minn. Ct. App. 2015
26, 2009); (“During the assault, [the victim] was afraid to scream or struggle because her sons might awaken and be injured.
State v. Wenthe 845 N.W.2d 222 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State v. Wenthe 845 N.W.2d 222 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
-39 (Minn.App.1991), review denied (Minn. Jan.
State v. Bauer 776 N.W.2d 462 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
State v. Bauer 776 N.W.2d 462 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
It simply creates a general intent crime.” review denied (Minn. Jan.
State v. Grampre 766 N.W.2d 347 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
State v. Grampre 766 N.W.2d 347 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
(concluding that departure was justified by multiple factors, including victim’s inability to flee because she was babysitting two infants); (reasoning that presence of children during home invasion and sexual assault of children’s mother increased vulnerability by compromising her ability to flee), review denied (Minn. Jan.
State v. Vance 765 N.W.2d 390 Minn. 2009
State v. Vance 765 N.W.2d 390 Minn. 2009
(concluding that a double durational departure was justified by a number of factors, including that the 14-year-old sexual assault victim was particularly vulnerable due to the fact that she was babysitting two infants and “she was not free to try to flee because she had a responsibility to the infants who were present”); (affirming an upward sentencing departure when the fact that the victim’s children were asleep in the next room increased the victim’s vulnerability and compromised the victim’
State v. Pendleton 725 N.W.2d 717 Minn. 2007
State v. Pendleton 725 N.W.2d 717 Minn. 2007
See Ihle, d at 917-19 (holding that various statutory means of committing legal obstruction are not so dissimilar that jury is required to find one unanimously); -39 (Minn.App.1991) (holding that jury does not need to unanimously agree on the statutory circumstance that warrants first-degree sexual assault, but rather that the victim either *733 sustained a personal injury or had fear of harm), rev. denied, (Minn. Nov.
State v. Heath 685 N.W.2d 48 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
State v. Heath 685 N.W.2d 48 Minn. Ct. App. 2004
review denied (Minn. Jan.
State v. Ihle 640 N.W.2d 910 Minn. 2002
State v. Ihle 640 N.W.2d 910 Minn. 2002
653 *918 (Minn.App.1993); rev. denied (Minn. Jan.
State v. Stempf 627 N.W.2d 352 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
State v. Stempf 627 N.W.2d 352 Minn. Ct. App. 2001
1(5); (stating the right to a unanimous jury verdict), review denied (Minn. Jan.
State v. Collins 580 N.W.2d 36 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
State v. Collins 580 N.W.2d 36 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
Guidelines II.D.2.b(l); (allowing departure based in part on age of 14- *46 year-old rape victim); (upholding departure where burglary and rape took place while children asleep in another room but defendant knew <f their presence), review denied (Minn. Jan.
State v. Esler 553 N.W.2d 61 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
State v. Esler 553 N.W.2d 61 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
review denied (Minn. Jan.
State v. Behl 547 N.W.2d 382 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
State v. Behl 547 N.W.2d 382 Minn. Ct. App. 1996
“Invasion of a victim’s zone of privacy, the home and curtilage, is an aggravating factor to consider for an upward departure.” review denied (Minn. Jan.
State v. Day 501 N.W.2d 649 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
State v. Day 501 N.W.2d 649 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
State v. Poole 489 N.W.2d 537 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
State v. Poole 489 N.W.2d 537 Minn. Ct. App. 1992

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