Cited by

for postconviction relief.” But when the evaluation of an ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim “requires additional factfinding,” such as when the evaluating court “needs to hear testimony from the defendant [and] his or her trial attorney,” the claim “is properly raised in a petition for postconviction relief, even though it was known at the time of direct appeal.” (denying defendant’s claims about counsel that required consideration of facts not in the trial record without prejudice to the

and sentencing hearing.” A claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel is not procedurally barred “when the claim requires examination of evidence outside the trial record or additional fact-finding by the postconviction court, because the claim is not based solely on the briefs and trial court transcript.” see, (stating that defendant’s claim that “his trial counsel failed to communicate two plea offers requires additional factfinding, so it is not barred by his having known of the claim

Robinson v. State , (requiring evidentiary hearing to determine whether in fact trial counsel communicated a plea offer).

It is also well-settled that “ ‘a pa rty may not raise issues for the first time on appeal’ from denial of postconviction relief.” (quoting Robinson v. State , n.2 (Minn. 1997)).

(holding that the district court did not clearly err when it credited the testimony of trial counsel that he conveyed the State’s plea offer to the defendant and when it rejected the defendant’s testimony that his trial counsel did not tell him about the State’s plea offer).

See, e.g. , Sullivan v. State , , 784 (Minn. 1998) (considering a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on an underlying claim against trial counsel); Robinson v. State , , 496 n.4 (Minn. 1997) (considering a claim that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise on appeal trial counsel's failure to request a lesser-included-offense instruction).

“‘It is well settled that a party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal’ from denial of postconviction relief.” Azure v. State , ( n.2 (Minn. 1997)).

The general rule is that “[o]nce an appeal has been taken, all issues raised and all issues known but not raised will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”

at 572, 572 n.1; (noting that when testimony from counsel may be relevant, it is appropriate to raise the claim in postconviction court).

(" 'It is well settled that a party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal' from denial of postconviction relief.” ( , 494 n.2 (Minn. 1997))).

(stating that “a court needs to hear testimony from the defendant, his or her trial attorney, and any other witnesses who have knowledge of conversations between the client and the attorney” to evaluate an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim involving the communication of information about pl

Additionally, “[t]he petitioner’s allegations 4 must be more than argumentative assertions without factual support.”

Consequently, (holding that an argument raised for the first time on appeal of a denial of a postconviction petition was not properly before us); (same).

v. State, n.2 (Minn. 1997) (“It is well settled that a party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal.”).

d 491, 495 (Minn. 1997) (holding that factual finding on “conflicting testimony” was not clearly erroneous).

see also Black, d at 86 n. 1 (“An exception [to the Knaffla rule] exists ...

We have determined that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim fits within the second exception to Knaffla “if it cannot be determined from the district court record and requires additional evidence, such as that involving attorney-client communications.” Torres, d at 572 (-95 (Minn.1997)).

Knaffla rule, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, even if “known but not raised at the time of direct appeal, may be brought in a postconviction petition if the claim cannot be ‘evaluated by an appellate court on direct appeal based on the briefs and trial court transcript, without any additional factfinding.’ ” ().

On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail.”); -55 (Minn.2001); -95 (Minn.1997).

See Dukes, d at 255 (holding a claim that an attorney’s admission of the defendant’s guilt without the defendant’s acquiescence warranted an evidentiary hearing); (holding a claim that counsel failed to communicate plea offers to the defendant warranted an evidentiary hearing); (explaining that a defendant cannot waive his or her fundamental rights to a jury trial or to counsel by silence).