Cited by

9 erroneous view of the law or constitutes an abuse of discretion.”

(stating an evidentiary error must be both an abuse of discretion and prejudicial to warrant reversal); (stating an evidentiary error is not prejudicial unless it might reasonably have influenced the trier of fact and changed the resul

“Even if a [district] court’s comments are not always appropriate, appellate courts will not intervene unless the comments were ‘prejudicial, biased or deprived plaintiffs of their right to a fair trial.’” ().

Sanctions are not appropriate where a party had “an objectively reasonable basis for pursuing a factual or legal claim.” -43 (Minn. 1990).

And “[a] reviewing court must generally 20 “Generally, a party who fails to remove a judge before the start of trial[ 7] has lost [their] opportunity to do so unless [the party] demonstrates prejudice or implied or actual bias.”

P. 11 (1989), “[a] party who has survived a summary judgment motion or a motion to dismiss certainly has no reason to believe that the court considers its claim or defense frivolous.” -45 (Minn. 1990) (quotation omitted).

2(3), 3.10 Sanctions “should not be imposed when an attorney has an ‘objectively reasonable basis for pursuing a factual or legal claim or when a competent attorney could form a reasonable belief [that] a pleading is well-grounded’ in fact and law.” ().

Whether sanctions are warranted depends on whether the attorney had “an objectively reasonable basis for pursuing a factual or legal claim or whe n a competent attorney could form a reasonable belief a pleading is well-grounded in fact and law.” superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Radloff v. First Am.

And a nonmonetary sanction may include “an order precluding the litigation of certain claims or defenses.” (quotation omitted), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Radloff v. First Am.

superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Radloff, d at 159.

(stating failure to timely disclose witnesses may warrant the exclusion of their testimony); (noting that the rules of discovery are aimed at preventing “unjust surprise and prejudice at trial, especially where the testimony of expert w

(concluding a party waives the right to remove a judge by proceeding without a timely assertion of the right); (stating that party failing to remove a judge before the start of trial waives the opportunity to do so as of right).

Because the witness was not timely disclosed, the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony.3 (stating failure to timely disclose witnesses may warrant the exclusion of their testimony); (stating that trial by ambush is a disfavored trial strategy).

A rule 11 violation does not require bad faith, but only a failure to “investigate the factual and legal underpinnings of a pleading” for which “ the imposition of sanctions is mandatory.”

See, (applying a “subjective test” to determine the existence of bad faith under a statute permitting sanctions for attorney conduct).

d 130, 143 (Minn. 1990), superseded by statute on other grounds, Minn. Stat. § 549.21 9 (1990) (repealed 1997).

Uselman v. Uselman , see also Minn. R. Civ.

Because one of th e primary purposes of rule 11 is to deter litigation abuse, the district court or the injured party should provide notice of the alleged violation “as early as possible during the proceedings to provide the attorney and party the opportunity to correct future conduct.”

3(b); see also Uselman v. Uselman , (“[A] party who fails to remove a judge before the start of 7 trial has lost its opportunity to do so unless it demonstrates prejudice or implied or actual bias.”).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has cautioned that sanctionable conduct “should be construed somewhat narrowly —while 14 some sanctionable conduct might under these circumstances escape discipline, that is preferable to deterring legitimate or arguably legitimate claims.” 8 The Stearnses claim that Metzger’s appeal is “being made in bad faith; .

“[A] party who fails to remove a judge bef ore the start of trial has lost i ts opportunity to do so unless it demonstrates prejudice or implied or actual bias.”

(applying 8 federal caselaw interpreting Fed.

(stating that a party who survived five motions for summary judgment or dismissal “with the major claims intact should not be subject to sanctions after trial predicated on these surviving claims”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Radloff v. First Am.

15, 2011), superseded by statute as stated in Radloff v. First Am.

It is true that a violation of Rule 11 does not require bad faith but only a failure to “investigate the factual and legal underpinnings of a pleading” for which “the imposition of sanctions is mandatory.” superseded by statute on other 5 The district court denied Copart’s motion for sanctions and attorney fees, concluding that “[Lubben’s] arguments were non-frivolous under Minn. Stat. § 549.211(2) and were brought with a good faith basis under Minnesota law.” Copart did not file a notice of rev

“A primary consideration is whether any claimed misconduct [by the district court] is so serious that it denies the litigants a fair trial.”

But “beneficiaries of a trust cannot maintain an action at law against a third person who commits a tort or other wrong with respect to the trust property” unless “the trustee fails to bring suit against [the] third party tortfeasor.” -38 (Minn. 1990), superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized by Radloff v. First Am.

(denying a motion for fees on appeal made under Rule 11 because the motion was beyond the scope of Rule 11), superseded by statute on other grounds, Minn.Stat.

(“If the court chooses to impose a monetary sanction, it might consider the attorney’s or party’s ability to pay.” (emphasis added)).

to investigate the factual and legal underpinnings of a pleading.”