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On summary 10 judgment, “[t]he nonmoving party must demonstrate that there is indeed a genuine issue of material fact.” Bob Useldinger & Sons

See Bob Useldinger & Sons, d 323, 328 (Minn. 1993) (“Mere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.”).

But “[m]ere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.” Bob Useldinger & Sons, see also Gradjelick v. Hance , (“A nonmoving party cannot defeat a summary judgment motion with unverified and conclusory allegations or by postulating evidence that might be developed at trial.”).

“Mere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.” Bob Useldinger & Sons, (requiring more than “unverified and conclusory allegations”).

“Mere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.” Bob Useldinger & Sons

Said otherwise, “[m]ere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.” Bob Useldinger & Sons

To meet its burden, the nonmoving party may not “rely upon speculation.” Limberg v. Mitchell , (quotation omitted); see also Bob Useldinger & Sons, (“Mere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.”).

at 321-22 (explaining that, although it had held in Bob Useldinger & Sons, , that a Miller-Shugart 7 We observe that, in its first appeal, King’s Cove urged the supreme court “to adopt a new rule in cases involving a single defendant” to allow district courts “to determine the reasonableness of a Miller-Shugart settlement agreement based on the value of the covered

But it must have some foundation other than mere conjecture.” Bob Useldinger & Sons

To meet its burden, the nonmoving party may not “rely upon speculation.” (quotation omitted); see also Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v. Hangsleben , (“Mere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.”).

“Mere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.” Bob Useldinger & Sons

“Summary judgment is not to be avoided simply because there is some metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue.” Bob Useldinger & Sons

describing the “fresh ice” of the patch, that there was “a little bit of snow on the sides, like, just what they couldn’t get between the rocks and stuff.” Thompson’s assertion that a “dusting of snow” could have obscured the ice patch is thus, at best, speculation and, “without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.” Bob Useldinger & Sons, (stating that “evidence [that] is more speculative than probative” is insufficient to overcome summary judgment).

See Bob Useldinger & Sons, (“Mere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.”).

See Bob Useldinger & Sons, (“Mere speculation, without some c oncrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.”).

But I disagree that appellant Virginia Staub has made a sufficient showing to raise her claim beyond “[m]ere speculation.” See Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v. Hangsleben

See Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v. Hangsleben

Bob Useldinger & Sons , Inc. v. Hangsleben

It would thus be “mere speculation” to conclude that the truck that Johnson saw dropping gravel on Lemond Road on the evening of the crash was PCi’s. See Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v. Hangsleben , (“Mere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.”).

Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v. Hangsleben

Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v. Hangsleben

v. Hangsleben, (stating that “[m]ere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment”).

Useldinger & Sons, (M inn.

See Bob Useldinger & Sons, (“Mere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.”).

A. Genuine Issue of Material Fact To avoid summary judgment, a party must show more than “some metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue.” Bob Useldinger & Sons

The parties in Braun’s lawsuit entered a Miller-Shugart agreement1 in which the 1 When the insurer does not “wholeheartedly defend the insured,” the insured may enter a Miller-Shugart agreement with the claimant in which the claimant agrees only to “sue for the insurance proceeds to enforce the settlement.” Bob Useldinger & Sons, & n.2 (Minn. 1993); -36 (Minn. 1982).

But “[m]ere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.” Bob Useldinger & Sons

D-1 Although it is true that, as the majority points out, all doubts and factual inferences must be resolved against the moving party, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying on “[m]ere speculation, without some concrete evidence.” Bob Useldinger & Sons

See Bob Useldinger & Sons, (stating “[M]ere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.”).

Bob Useldinger & Sons, (“Mere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.”).

See Bob Useldinger & Sons, (stating that “[m]ere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment”).