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Yet the state may attack the defense’s theory of the case so long as they are based in evidence, and the prosecutor’s remarks here were.

As Okero points out, we have held that “[i]t is improper for the prosecutor to make statements urging the jury to protect society or send a message with its verdict.” (d 815, 819 (Minn. 1993) ) (other citation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000); (“It is improper for a prosecutor to urge the jury to protect society with its verdict.”), rev. denied (Minn. May 14, 2002).

Further, the statement does not urge the jury to convict Jenni to protect society, rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000), nor does it urge the jury to hold Jenni accountable for his alleged conduct, d 815, 819 (Minn. 1993).

d 815, 817-18 (Minn. 1993).

A prosecutor should also avoid arguments that “divert the [fact-finder] 16 from its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law, or by making predictions of the consequences of the [fact-finder’s] verdict.” State v. Salitros , (quotation omitted).

(ordering a new trial because prosecutors persisted in employing tactics condemned by this court); (ordering a new trial to underscore the importance of compliance with discovery obligations); (

But we note our supreme court expect s both prosecutors and defense counsel to be mindful of “case law proscribing particular conduct as well as the standards of conduct prescribed by the ABA.” Ramey, d at 301; d 815, 817 (Minn. 1993) (noting that “defense counsel is neither a mouthpiece nor an ordinary agent, but a professional advocate governed by rules of professional ethics and decorum”).

was aware of or had participated in “active shooter drills at school.” The factfinder’s role “is limited to deciding dispassionately whether the state has met its burden in the case at hand of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

(noting that a prosecutor’s claim that 4 the offered defense is commonly employed when nothing else will work is disparaging to the defense); -49 (Minn. 1994) (noting it is inappropriate to belittle the defense by suggesting that the defense is “the only def

“[T]he prosecutor is a minister of justice whose obligation is to guard the rights of the accused as well as to enforce the rights of the public.” d 815, 817 (Minn. 1993) (quotation omitted).

[a jury’s] role is limited to deciding dispassionately whether the state has met its burden in the case at hand.”

The supreme court has “made it clear that the prosecutor is free to specifically argue that there is no merit to a particular defense in view of the evidence or no merit to a particular argument.”

Even when we would not usually grant a new trial, we can reverse “prophylactically or in the interests of justice.”

Prosecutors disparage the defense if they make arguments “belittling a particular defense in the abstract.”

But at the same time, “[w]e have made it clear that the prosecutor is free to specifically argue that there i s no merit to a particular defense in view of the evidence or no merit to a particular argument.” State v. Salitros

See State v. Salitros , (explaining that juries do not “enforce the law or teach defendants lessons”).

See State v. Salitros , (explaining that a prosecutor commits misconduct by labeling an argument as a “common defense tactic”).

The prosecutor is a “minister of justice whose obligation is to guard the rights of the accused as well as to enforce the rights of the public.” At oral argument to this court, the state acknowledged that Bolton presented a “strong” alibi defense.

Riddle correctly notes that “ the jury’s role is not to enforce the law or teach defendants lessons o r make statements to the public.” State v. Salitros

However, a “prosecutor is free to specifically argue that there is no merit to a particular defense in view of th e evidence or no merit to a particular argument.” State v. Salitros

8 to a particular argument.”

But the jury’s “role is limite d to deciding dispassionately whether the state has met its burden in the case at hand of pro ving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

However, a “prosecutor is free to specifically argue that there is no merit to a particular defense in view of the evidence or no merit to a particular argument.”

The jury’s “role is limited to deciding dispassionately whether the state has met its burden in the case at hand of proving the defendant guilty beyond a r easonable doubt.” State v. Salitros

In the past, when courts have disregarded our rulings, see State v. Lefthand , , 801-02 (Minn. 1992), or when the integrity of the fact-finding process has needed protection, see Pederson v. State , , 164-65 (Minn. 2002), we have exercised our supervisory powers, which include the power to reverse a case prophylactically, see State v. Salitros , , 820 (Minn. 1993).

During a closi ng argument, a prosecutor may argue “all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record,” but must not “misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.”

In State v. Jones, the supreme court concluded that the prosecutor’s “reference to the defense strategy as an ‘old trick’ was an error that was plain.” (stating that it is “clearly improper for a prosecutor to sugg est that the arguments of defense counsel are part of some sort of syndrome of standard arguments that one finds defense counsel making in cases of this sort”).

A criminal defendant’s case shall be “decided not on the basis of extraneous matters but on the basis of evidence relevant to the issues raised and the legitimate inferences from that evidence.”

” See State v. Williams , -49 (Minn. 1994); (concluding that the prosecutor improperly argued: “What do you typically hear about a rape case?