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–47 (Minn. 1999) (concluding that a defendant’s substantial rights were not prejudiced by a mid-trial constructive amendment of a first - degree murder charge instructing the jury on a theory of vicarious liability because the state gave notice of the requested amendment to the defense at the close of the state

d at107; (stating that the prima facie showing was met by the prosecutor’s peremptory strike to remove the only Black juror); (finding a prima facie case was established when the prosecutor peremptorily struck the only two Native American jurors when the defendant was also Native American).

we recognize that it may be a better practice for the state to include this information in the complaint, “aiding and abetting” under Minn. Stat. § 609.05 “is not a separate substantive offense [from the underlying crime] and can be added [and instructed upon] at any point prior to a verdict or finding” even if there is no ‘“aiding and abetting’ language in the complaint.”

Aiding and abetting is not a separate substantive offense, rather, it is akin to a lesser-included offense.

A defendant may be prejudiced by an amendment pursuant to rule 17.05 if the amendment adversely affects “the opportunity to prepare a defense.” (stating that rule 17.05 protects against “violating due process notions of timely notice” and “adversely affecting the trial tactics of the defense”).

Yet, “aiding and abetting is not a separate substantive offense.”

and because the primary defense to the charges was that the niece confused Gabriel-Ramos with the cousin, expanding the charging dates allowed the jury to consider additional time in which the cousin was not around, thereby “eviscerat[ing] his defense.” The supreme court has stated that “the opportunity to prepare a defense in a criminal case is a substantial right.”

1 (2020) (“A person is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.”); (explaining that “aiding and abetting is not a separate substantive offense,” and accomplices are criminally liable as principals).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has “long he ld that aiding and abetting is not a separate substantive offense.” (“It is undisputed that aiding and abetting is not a separate substantive offense.”); Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd.

(discussing indictment).

.”), and particularly when the amendment only adds an aiding-and-abetting theory, which is not a separate substant ive offense, —forced him to waive his spee dy-trial demand.

P. 17.05; (applying both prongs).

For example, in State v. DeVerney, the supreme court applied rule 17.05 in analyzing the appellant’s a rgument that the district court “improperly instructed the jury on a theory of vicarious liability which was not included in the indictment.”

However, the supreme court has “long held that aiding and abetting is not a separate substantive offense.” see also State v. Ostrem , 535 N.W .2d 916, 922 (Minn. 1995) (“It is undis puted that aiding and abetting is not a separate substantive offense .”); (“[T]here is no separate crime of criminal liability for a crime committed by another person.”).

(quoting Moore, d at 107 ); (concluding that a prima facie showing was established when the defendant was a Native American and both Native.American jurors were struck); Greenleaf, d at 501 (same).

–46 (Minn. 1999) (noting that “the indictment was never formally amended,” but jury instructions that added vicarious -liability theory was a “variance” from the indictment, subject to rule 17.05); (concluding that state constructively amended the complaint

The supreme court has explained that “aiding and abetting is not a separate substantive offense.”

(“[T]he opportunity to prepare a defense in a criminal case is a substantial right.”).

The Minnesota Supreme Court “ha[s] long held that aiding and abetting is not a separate substantive offense and can be added at any point prior to a verdict or finding.”

(stating that standard).

In State v. DeVerney, “[a]t the close of the state’s case, the state indicated that it would seek aiding and abetting instructions under both subdivisions 1 and 2, and at the close of all the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on both.”

The state, argues that transferred intent is a theory of culpability that does not constitute a new or additional offense for purposes of requesting an amendment to the indictment or complaint under Minn. R.Crim.

Review of joinder decisions requires “an independent inquiry into [whether] any substantial prejudice to defendants may have resulted from the joinder.” ().

(concluding that defendant’s confrontation rights were not violated because limitations on cross-examination “did not prevent [defendant] from discrediting [the witness’s] testimony as biased”).

-06 (Minn.2006) (holding that limitation on cross-examination of cooperating witness regarding the exact penalty the witness otherwise would have received was not a Confrontation Clause violation where defendant was allowed to cross-examine on other aspects of the plea agreement); (holding that limitation on cross-examination of accomplice as to specific penalty reduction in exchange for accomplice’s testimony was not a Confrontation Clause violation where defendant was not prohibited from cross

However, we have said that “[t]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only ‘an opportunity for cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’ ” (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 , 107 S.Ct.

In reviewing a court’s pretrial decision regarding joinder, we make “an independent inquiry into any substantial prejudice to defendants that may have resulted from their being joined for trial.” ().