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D E C I S I O N “When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” ().

3 “[W]hen reviewing a pr e-trial order suppressing evidence where the facts are not in dispute and the trial cour t’s decision is a question of law, the reviewing court may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.”

“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” ().

“The question of whether consent is voluntary is a question of fact, and is based on all relevant circumstances.” d 218, 222 (Minn. 1992) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047-48 (1973)).

“When reviewi ng pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” ().

Turning to that issue, this court “independently review[s] the facts and determine[s], as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing— the evidence.” ().

IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10 ; see State v. Othoudt , -22 (Minn. 1992) .

State v. Othoudt , –22 (Minn. 1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967)).

(stating that “when reviewing a pre-trial order suppressing evidence where the facts are not in dispute and the trial court’s decision is a question of law, the reviewing court may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed”).

-22 (Minn. 1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967)).

DECISION I. “When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” ().

We took a on an issue of warrantless arrest..

DECISION “[W]hen reviewing a pre-trial order suppressing evidence where the facts are not in dispute and the [district] court’s decision is a question of law, the reviewing court may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.” -22 (Minn. 1992) (holding that, absent some manifestation of consent to an officer’s warrantless entry into a home, the entry is not made with consent).

DECISION “When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” ().

“We may independently review facts that are not in dispute, and ‘determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.’” ().

hat there may be a burglary in progress or a medical emergency.” The district court further determined that “the officers would have been derelict in their duty had they not entered the home” and their “decision to enter the home without a warrant was reasonable.” We “independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.”

DECISION “When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” ().

(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967)).

(noting that the consent necessary under Payton, is “consent to enter, not consent to arrest”).