Cited by

n.9 (Minn. 2000) (“Because the other issues raised are dispositive of this matter, we do not address this argument.”).

(holding that the proponent of scientific evidence bears the burden of establishing admissibility).

n.9 (Minn. 2000) (“Because the other issues raised are dispositive of this matter, we do not address [an alternative] argument.”).

n.9 (Minn. 2000) (“Because the other issues raised are dispositive of this matter, we do not address this argument.”).

n.9 (Minn. 2000) (“Because the other issues raised are dispositive of this matter, we do not address this argument.”).

“Foundational reliability requires the proponent of a test to establish that the test itself is reliable and that its administration in the particular instance conformed to the procedure necessary to ensure reliability.” (quotations omitted).

When an expert’s opinion involves a scientific test, the judge must confirm “that the test itself is reliable and that its administration in the particular instance conformed to the procedure necessary to ensure reliability.”

d 800, 815 (Minn. 2000).

Paul & Minneapolis, (explaining that the “underlying reliability, consistency, and accuracy of the theory” of an expert lie at “the heart of the foundational reliability question”); (requiring a proponent of scientific evidence to show that the “methodology used [by the expert] is reliable and in the particular instance produced reliable results”).

Doe, d at 165 (d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000)).

“The primary function of notice pleading is to give the 8 adverse party fair notice of the theory on which the claim for relief is based.” (quotation omitted).

Paul & Minneapolis, (explaining that the “underlying reliability, consistency, and accuracy of the theory” of an expert lie at “the heart of the foundational reliability question”); (requiring a proponent of scientific evidence to show that the “methodology used [by the expert] is reliable and in the part icular instance produced reliable results”).

Goeb v. Tharaldson , , 815 (Minn. 2000) (explaining that whether a particular principle or technique is generally accepted in the relevant scientific field is a question of law that we review de novo).

Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 provide s that a district court “may” admit expert testimony if the expert’s “ scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” “The proponent of scientific evidence has the burden to establish the proper foundation for [its] admissibility.”

Doe v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis , , 156 (Minn. 2012) ("The Frye -Mack standard governs the admissibility of expert testimony that involves a novel scientific theory.") (quotation omitted); Goeb v. Tharaldson , , 814 (Minn. 2000) (reaffirming Minnesota's adherence to the Frye -Mack general-acceptance standard and rejecting the less-stringent standard set out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc ., 509 U.S. 579 , 589-90, 113 S.Ct.

n.9 (Minn. 2000) (“Because the other issues raised are dispositive of this matter, we do not address this argument.”).

(describing requiremen ts of Frye-Mack standard).

And when expert testimony is based on a scientific test, “the proponent of a test [must] establish that the test itself is reliable 12 and that its administration in the particular instance conformed to the procedure necessary to ensure reliability.” (emphasis added) (quotation omitted); see also Gen.

d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000).

(stating that, under the Frye-Mack standard, “when novel scientific evidence is offered, the district court must determine whether it is generally accepted in the relevant scien tific community,” and whether “the particular scientific evidence .

(using a “liberal” reading of pleadings when deciding if they give an adverse party fair notice of the theory on which a claimant seeks relief).

(stating that the proponent of scientific evidence has the burden of establishing its admissibility by demonstrating the relevant requirements).

When expert testimony is not based on novel scientific evidence, it must be shown to “be relevant, be given by a witness qualified as an expert, and be helpful to the trier of fact.”

To meet the second prong, the proponent must prove that the generally accepted methodology “produced reliable results in the specific case.” Bailey, d at 397-98 ().

(holding that the proponent of scientific evidence has the burden of establishing its admissibility by establishing the relevant requirements).