Cited by

d 89, 96 (Minn. 2004) (concluding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction claim because, while recanted testimony was relevant to the appellant’s guilt, “[t]here was ample evidence independent of .

A display of irritation or disapproval by a judge “does not ordinarily justify disqualification.” -94 (Minn. 2004).

(“A motion to remove for cause is committed to the discretion of the trial court and this court will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion.”).

(stating appellate courts review the denial of a motion to disqualify a postconviction judge for an abuse of discretion).

A party’s “subjective belief that the judge is biased does not 13 necessarily warrant removal.”

However, a party’s “subjective 9 belief that the judge is biased does not necessarily warrant removal.”

“A motion to remove for cause is committed to the discretion of the trial court and [appellate] court[s] will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion.” .

(“[A] petitioner’s subjective belief that the judge is biased does not nece ssarily warrant [disqualification].”).

“A motion to remove a judge for cause is procedural and is therefore governed by the rules of criminal procedure.”

“A motion to remove for cause is committed to the discretion of the [district] court and this court will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion.” Hooper v. State

See State v. Hooper (Hooper I), d 31 (Minn. 2000); State v. Hooper (Hooper II), State v. Hooper (Hooper III)

(“While removal is warranted when the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, a[n] [appellant’s] subjective belief that the judge is biased does not necessarily warrant removal.”).

As we made clear in Hooper v. State, “[a] postconviction proceeding is an extension of the criminal prosecution.”

(“While removal is warranted when the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, a[n] [appellant’s] subjective belief that the judge is biased does not necessarily warrant removal.”); McKenzie, d at 747.

Compare Dobbins, d at 735-36 (“Because the State had little other direct evidence against [the petitioner], and [the petitioner’s] theory of the case was credible, we conclude the jury might have reached a different conclusion had [the witness’s] alleged false testimony not been admitted.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)), (concluding that a recantation regarding a confession did not satisfy the second prong of the Larrison test because two other witnesses also heard the de

See Hooper v. State (Hooper II), State v. Hooper (Hooper I)

We examine whéther the jury “would not likely” have found the defendant guilty and consider whether the “other evidence against the defendant was overwhelming.” (concluding there was compelling evidence outside the witness’s testimony to support the finding of guilt); (concluding recantation was “not lik

-95 (Minn.2004) (holding that nodding in approval and otherwise remaining silent when directly asked if his testimony was false did not meet the first prong of Larri *738 son), with Ferguson, d at 558, 560-61 (holding that the postconviction court should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine whethe

In other words, “[a]n evidentiary hearing is required ‘unless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.’ ” (quoting Minn. Stat. § 590.04 , subd.

at 219 ; ("A postconviction proceeding is an extension of the criminal prosecution.”).

“A motion to remove a judge for cause is procedural and is therefore governed by the rules of criminal procedure.”