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Additionally, Minnesota caselaw states that the jury instruction on this right “should not be given without the personal and clear consent of the defendant.”

Moreover, “it is improper to inject race into a closing argument when race is not relevant.”

A district court “should not give a no- adverse-inference instruction unless the defense requests it and then, the better practice is for the [district] court to inquire of the defendant himself whether he wishes to have such an instruction.” McCollum, d at 616; (“We have made clear that [the no- adverse- inference instruction] should not be given without the personal and clear consent of the defendant.”).

8 assume that the defendant made the threats or that associates of the defendant did so at the defendant’s behest.” (quotation omitted).

“Bias may be induced by a witness’ like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness’ self -interest.” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984).

Id.; (stating that a district court must obtain the defendant’s “personal and clear consent” before giving the instruction).

State v. Clifton , d 793, 798 (Minn. 2005).

Compare Gomez, d at 881 (concluding that district court committed plain error by giving no-inference instruc tion because the record did not establish defendant’s consent), with State v. Clifton , (“Our independent review of the record satisfies us that [defendant] and his attorney agreed to the instruction.”).

“A [district] court ordinarily should not give a no - adverse-inference instruction unless the defense requests it,” and because the instruction “calls the defendant’s silence to the jury’s attention,” the instruction “ordinarily should not be done without the defendant’s personal consent.” 616-17 (Minn. 2002); (“We have made clear that CRIMJIG 3.17 should not be given without the personal and clear consent of the defendant.”).

“A [district] court ordinarily should not give a no -adverse-inference instruction unless the defe nse requests it ,” and because the instruction “calls the defendant’s silence to the jury’s attention,” the instruction “ordinarily should not be done without the defendant’s personal consent .” McCollum, d at 616–17; see also State v. Clifton , (“We have made clear that CRIMJIG 3.17 should not be given without the personal and clear consent of the defendant.”).

The no-adverse-inference instruction “should not be given without the personal and clear consent of the defendant.”

Appellant attempts to meet this burden and obtain a new trial by relying on three Minnesota cases, review denied (Minn. May 16, 2000)

“Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness’ testimony.” United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52, 105 S. Ct. 465, 469 (1984); d 793, 797 (Minn. 2005) (“Evidence of bias is al most always relevant .

And in cases where threat evidence is admissi ble, the district court should provide “cautionary 13 instructions to prevent the evidence from being misused.” State v. Clifton , d 793, 797 (Minn. 2005).

“Evidence of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness’ testimony.” (quotation omitted).

“Evidence of bias ‘is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness’[s] testimony.’” d 793, 797 (Minn. 2005) (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52, 105 S. Ct. 465, 469 (1984)).

whether [he or she] wishes to have such an instruction.” accord McCollum, d at 617 (stating that if the defendant requests the instruction, the district court or defense counsel should make a record of “the defendant’s clear consent and insistence that the instruction be given”).

d at 51 (-98 (Minn.2005)).

(observing that evidence of third-party threats against witnesses could be ex *595 tremely prejudicial if viewed as coming from defendant).

If we conclude that the State committed prose-cutorial misconduct, we will grant a new trial when the misconduct “impaired the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” -99 (Minn.2005) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

(declining to grant new trial in interests of justice because alleged prose-cutorial errors “appear to be the result of oversight or mistake, not deliberate attempts to hide facts or surprise the defense”), (stating that, although prosecutor’s comments were inappropriate, she did not use race to disparage defendant and her argument had basis in record, thus rendering reversal in interests of justice inappropriate), (reversing in interests of justice