Cited by

d 475, 492 (Minn. 2006) (“Widely-accepted rules of construction dictate that specific provisions control over general provisions.”).

To support a substantive-due-process claim, “the government’s conduct [must be] ‘so egregious that it shocks the conscience.’” Brown, d at 503 (quoting Mumm 17 v. Mornson, ).

“A cognizable claim of a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation must describe governmental conduct so egregious that it ‘shocks the conscience.’” (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952)).

Conduct at Issue Barlage argues that the district court erred by defining the conduct at issue as his “decision to allow Harvey to return to the match after he may have been knocked unconscious.” We must define the “precise governmental conduct at issue,” which, in a negligence action like this one, is the conduct the plaintiff alleges was negligent, Watson by Hanson v. Metro.

(quotation omitted); d 900, 906 (Minn. 2015) (“In the context of executive action, .

“[G]overnmental entities have the authority to eliminate by policy the discretion of their employees.”

A discretionary duty involves “individual professional judgment that necessarily reflects the professional goal and factors of a situation.” -91 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).

“Official immunity enables public employees to perform their duties effectively, without fear of personal liability that might inhibit the exercise of their independent judgment.”

Mumm v. Mornson, 4 (quotation omitted).

A discretionary duty “involves more individual professional judgment that necessarily reflects the professional goal and factors of a situation.” Mumm v. Mornson , -91 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).

see also Wiederholt, d at 315 (defining ministerial duties as those with no room for discretion and that are “absolute, certain, and imperative” (quotation omitted)).

Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep.

on the nature of the act.” Vassallo, d at 462 (alteration in original) ().

(examining allegations in the complaint to determine the conduct at issue); (stating conduct challenged as asserted by plaintiff-respondents); Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability if ‘their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” d 475, 483 (Minn. 2006) (citation omitted) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

“[T]he existence of a policy that sets a sufficientl y narrow standard of conduct will make a public employee’s conduct ministerial if he is bound to follow the policy.” Mumm v. Mornson

See Mumm v. Mornson , (noting that when plaintiff’s 7 constitutional claims lack specificity, courts will still address them if facts alleged sufficiently state a claim); (stating that Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection challenge requires showing by plaintiff

The first step is to identify the alleged tortious conduct—“the precise governmental conduct at issue.”

” Halva, d at 503 (quotation omitted); (explaining that the object of a complaint is to “put the defendant on notice of the claims against him” ).

The primary purpose of a complaint is to “put the defendant on notice of the claims against him.” see Rogers v. Drewry, 264 N.W.

See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998); (applying the standard in an excessive force case).

on the nature of the act.”

Our role is to determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and “whether the district court erred in applyi ng the law.”

See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996) (determining collateral-order doctrine allowed immediate review of “abstract issue of law” related to qualified immunity); (“An order denying summary judgment on immunity grounds is immediately appealable.”).

4 Government officials sued for damages under section 1983 may raise the affirmative defense of qualified or “good faith” immunity.

“A cognizable claim of a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation must describe governmental conduct so egregious that it shocks the conscience.” (quotation omitted).

“In reviewing an appeal from the denial of summary judgment, [appellate courts] must determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in applying the law.”

“Official immunity enables public employees to perform their duties effectively, without fear of personal liability that might inhibit the exercise of their independent judgment.” Mumm v. Mornson , (Mi nn.

A party alleging a constitutional violation, must demonstrate “governmental conduct so egregious that it shocks the conscience.” (quotation.omitted).

1 (2016) (explaining that the “special provision shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general provision”); (‘Widely-accepted rules of construction dictate that specific provisions control over general provisions.”).

1 (2016) (explaining that the “special provision shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the gener al provision”) ; (“Widely -accepted rules of construction dictate that specific provisions control over general provisions.”).

guilt during treatment violates substantive due process because it “forces [him] to make a private, sexual admission that violates his deeply held personal belief that he is innocent.” When a petitioner frames his substantive due-process interests in light of a more “particular amendment,” that amendment applies, “not the more generalized notion of substantive due process.” (quotation omitted) .

Assuming, as Martinez claims, that he has a fundamental liberty interest in his release during his supervised-release term, he must show “governmental conduct so egregious that it shocks the conscience.” Mumm v. Mornson , (quotation omitted).