Cited by

But multiple sentences may not be imposed if they “unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”

“Whether a defendant commits multiple- victim crimes is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.” (citation omitted).

conduct is considered when multiple sentences arise out of a single behavioral incident, this does not mean such unfair exaggeration cannot also be considered in another context.

Under the multiple-victim exception to section 609.035, a district court may impose “multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” d 423, 426 (Minn. 2006).

If there are multiple victims, the district court must not impose sentences that “unfairly 10 exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” d 423, 426 (Minn. 2006).

[and l]ocal residents may fear for their safety,”

(permitting multiple sentences when the crimes involve multiple victims and the sentences do not unfairly exaggera te the criminality of the 1 Flantz also argues that his conviction for count five violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Minnesota and U.S. Constitutions.

Under the multiple-victim rule, “courts are not prevented from giving a defendant multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”

-80 (Minn. App. 2005), aff’d

We recognized the unique nature of this offense in State v. Skipintheday, when we said, “a coconspirator helps someone commit a crime, but an accomplice after - the-fact helps a person who has committed a crime evade the law.”

“Whether a defendant commits multiple-victim crimes is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.” State v. Skipintheday

to mention an important judicially-created exception under which courts may impose multiple sentences for “crimes aris ing out of a single be havioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” See State v. Ferguson , (quoting State v. Skipintheday , ).

“[C]ourts are not prevented from giving a defendant multip le sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a sin gle behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant ’s conduct.” State v. Skipintheday , ().

This rule allows “multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defend ant’s conduct.” State v. Skipintheday , .

We review de novo “[w]hether an offense is subject to multiple sentences under Minn. Stat. § 609.035.” State v. Ferguson , 90 (Minn. 2012) (citing State v. Skipintheday , ).

d 423, 426 (Minn. 2006).

State v. Skipintheday , , 426 (Minn. 2006) ; see also Munt , d at 417 (stating that legislature did not intend to immunize offenders from consequences of *458 separate crimes against separate victims.

Imposition of two sentences “[C]ourts are not prevented from giving a defendant multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant 's conduct.”

a court may only enter a sentence for one crime arising out of a single behavioral incident, “courts are not prevented from giving a defendant multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant ’s conduct.” State v. Skipintheday , , 426 (M inn.

“[C]ourts are not prevented from giving a defendant multiple sentences for multipl e crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the cr imes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple 10 sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”

However, under the multiple-victim exception, “courts are not prevented from giving a defendant multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) mu ltiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”

(stating that under-the multiple-victim exception, "courts are not prevented from giving a defendant multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality'of

A district court may impose “multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”

See, e.g., Kenard, d at 444-45 (discussing caselaw assigning severity level rankings of 8 to 10 for accomplice after the fact crimes); aff’d, (ruling district court did not abuse discretion by assigning severity level 8 to accomplice after the fact crime).

This offense is distinguished from those in which a person aids and abets the commission of a crime or conspires with another to commit a crime; a person who aids an offender after the fact “‘interfere[es] with the processes of justice and is best dealt with in those terms.’” (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.6(a), at 404 (2d ed. 2003)).

Under the multiple-victim exception, a district court may impose “multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”

See Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2012); d 423, 426 (Minn. 2006).

“[H]is offense is instead that of interfering with the processes of justice,” (quotation omitted); see, e.g., Scruggs, d at 641 (“[L]ying to the police is after-the-fact assistance, which is not relevant to an accomplice determination.” (quotation omitted)).

-27 , 426 n. 3 (Minn.2006) (distinguishing between co-conspirator who helps someone commit crime and accomplice-after-the-fact who is involved after victims have been harmed).