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is a unique judicial tool.”

For instance, although not central to our holdings, in cases we decided after the promulgation of Guidelines 2.B.2.a —when the Guidelines first used the word “probation” in connection with custody status points—we have referred colloquially and in passing to the conditions associated with a stay of adjudication as “conditions of probation.” –56 (Minn. 1996) (overruled in part as D-6 recognized in Lee, d at 496).

A district court may not order a stay of adjudication over a prosecutor’s objection unless there has been “a clear abuse of discretion by the prosecutor in the exer cise of the charging function.” State v. Lee

In addition, the supreme court has held that a “clear abuse of the prosecutorial charging function must be found by the court before it may order a stay of adjudication over the prosecutor’s objection.” State v. Lee , (reaffirming the standard announced in Foss).

And “unless the prosecutor abuses his or her discretion or demonstrates improper intent, the judiciary is powerless to interfere with th e prosecutor’s charging authority.” S tate v. Lee , (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The separation-of-powers doctrine pre cludes judicial interference with “the prosecutor’s charging authority.” d 491, 496 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).

State v. Lee , Furthermore, “[t] he interpretation of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure is a question we review de novo.” Reynolds v. State

But “[w]e are extremely relu ctant to overrule our pr ecedent[,]” and “require[] a ‘compelling reason’ to do so.” (quoting Oanes v. Allstate Ins.

See, -96 (Minn. 2005) (noting district courts may impose jail time when staying adjudication, although reversing because district court erred in staying adjudication); Moody, d at 877-78 (affirming district court decision to stay adjudication and impose jail time because “[a] period of local incarceration i

A district court should exercise this power “only for the purpose of avoiding an injustice resulting from the prosecutor’s clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function.” (quoting Foss, d at 541).

State v. Lee , , 494 (Minn. 2005) (quoting Oanes v. Allstate Ins.

State v. Lee , , 494 (Minn. 2005).

State v. Guzman , , 809 (Minn. 2017) (citing State v. Lee , , 493 (Minn. 2005) ).

Harris , d at 598 (quoting State v. Lee , , 494 (Minn. 2005) ); see also Schuette v. City of Hutchinson , , 238 (Minn. 2014) ("The doctrine of stare decisis ...

*809 We “construe and interpret rules of criminal procedure de novo.” ( , 785 (Minn. 2006)).

A district court may stay an adjudication of guilt over the prosecutor’s objection “only for the purpose of avoiding an injustice resulting from the prosecutor’s clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function.” (quotation omitted).

We are “extremely reluctant” to overrule our precedent and will not do so without a “compelling reason.”

1”); -25 (Minn. App. 2008) (same, in a case involving a defendant’s right to appeal, relying on Manns); -95 (Minn. 2005) (holding that stay of adjudication in nonfelony case was a pretrial order that was appealable by state, despite imposition of jail time, relying on Verschelde).

1(4); (stating that stay of adjudication in misdemeanor case is “more akin to a pretrial order than a sentence”).

(stating that “clear abuse of the prosecutorial charging function must be found by the court before it may order a stay of adjudication over the prosecutor’s objection”).

(stating that we are “extremely reluctant to overrule our precedent” and that “we have required a ‘compelling reason’ to do so” (quoting Oanes v. Allstate Ins.

(stating that we require a "compelling reason” before a prior decision will be overturned); (explaining that we are “extremely reluctant to overrule our precedent under principles of stare decisis ”).