Cited by

–22 (Minn. 2005) (discussing reasons to decide some moot issues, including those that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review”).

(providing three situations where we will depart from the Supreme Court’s guidance when interpreting substantially similar language); –25 (Minn. 2005) (discussing our approach when interpreting the Minnesota Constitution).

(“It is a well-established rule in Minnesota that a court only has jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment if there is a justiciable controversy.”).

(“As the highest court of this state, we have said that we are and should be the first line of defense for individual liberties within the federalist system.

In considering whether the Minnesota Constitution provides greater protections than the United States Constitution, our Minnesota Supreme Court has instructed that it does not “construe our state constitution as providing more protection for individual rights than does the federal constitution unless there is a principled basis to do so.”

To be justiciable, a controversy must “involve[] definite and concrete assertions of right.” d 815, 821 (Minn. 2005).

Engel also offers no analysis of why the exclusionary rule under the Minnesota Constitution should afford him greater protections than the federal exclusionary rule, (articulating factors for raising an argument under the state constitution), nor provides explanation for how the exclusionary rule under the Minnesota Constitution should differ from the federal exclusionary rule.

Olson-Baker is generally correct that the Minnesota Constitution may afford broader protections than the United States Constitution, but the supreme court has cautioned that courts must take a “restrained approach when both constit utions use identical or substantially similar language.”

(acknowledging that states cannot interpret their constitutions to provide less protection than federal constitution).

(explaining that if a court cannot grant effective relief, the matter is generally dismissed as moot).

The second exception to the mootness doctrine applies when “the harm to the plaintiff is ‘capable of repetition yet evading review.’” Snell, d at 284 ().

(explaining that we will apply the state constitution when “the Supreme Court has retrenched on Bill of Rights issues, or if we determine that federal precedent does not adequately protect our citizens’ basic rights and liberties”).

A. We begin by considering our exception for “issues that are capable of repetition, yet likely to evade review.”

This exception may apply if “‘(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same 12 complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.’” (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)).

we go no further and “there is no room for the application of rules of construction.” Kernan v. Holm , see also Shefa, d at 825 (explaining that “[w]hen we determine that the language of a constitutional provision is unambiguous, the language is ‘effective as written and we do not apply any other rules of c onstruction’ ” ()); (explaining that we may consider “other indicia of intent” only when the language of the constitution is ambiguous).

See Onvoy, Inc. v. ALLETE, Inc., (“[T]he court has no jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment proceeding unless there is a justiciable controversy.”); (“[W]e will not deem a case moot, and thus will retain jurisdiction, if the case is functionally justiciable.” (quotation omitted)); State ex rel.

2 “Mootness is an issue of justiciability, which is an issue of law we review de novo.” State ex rel.

Issues are “capable of repetition, yet evading review” when two elements are met: “(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjec ted to the same action again.” Kahn v. Griffin , (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford , 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S. Ct. 347, 349 (1975)).

in support of that argument.

Minnesota due-process analysis Turning to Troyer’s claim under the Minnesota Due Process Clause, we recognize that Minnesota courts “can and will interpret our state constitution to afford greater 11 protections of individual civil and political rights than does the federal constitution.”

The “right to vote is considered fundamental under both the U.S. Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution.”

But “we will not construe our state constitution as providing more protection for individual rights than does the federal constitution unless there is a principled basis to do s o.”

See Kahn v. Griffin , d 815, 821 (Minn. 2005) (stati ng that a case is moot if there is no longer a justiciable controversy for the court to decide).

See Carlson v. Simon , (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a statutory requirement for a write-in presidential candid ate to name a vice-presidential candidate); (conclud ing that challengers “failed to provide any principled basis” for the court to declare a statute unconstitutional) .

An appeal is moot when “a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible.” (stating that a case should be dismissed as moot when the court is “unable to grant effectual relief”).

See U.S. Const. art. I, § 6 (stating that "for any [s]peech or [d]ebate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other [p]lace"); see also Kahn v. Griffin , , 824 (Minn. 2005) (noting that when interpreting the Minnesota Constitution, the supreme court favors uniformity with the United States Constitution and will not "lightly reject" the Supreme Court's interpretation of "substantially similar language").

“[M]ootness can be described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: the requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” (quotation omitted).

See Kahn v. Griffin , , 824 (Minn. 2005).

See In re Guardianship of Tschumy , , 740-41 (Minn. 2014) (reaching merits of a moot issue to clarify the scope of guardians' authority to remove life-support for a ward because of the thousands of wards within the state); Kahn v. Griffin , , 823 (Minn. 2005) (considering merits of an election procedure because it was similar to procedures used in other Minnesota cities).

d we acknowledge that past cases from Minnesota courts have cited the federal standard that capable of repetition yet evading review means “(1) the challenged action was in it s duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” (citing Weinstein v. Bradford , 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S. Ct. 347, 348 (1975)).

Kahn v. Griffin , , 821 (Minn. 2005).

However, mootness is a “flexible discretionary doctrine, not a mechanical rule that is invoked automatically.” (quotation omitted).