Cited by

(stating district court can deny motion to modify custody without an evidentiary hearing if moving party fails to make prima facie case); (stating that, “[a]t the prima-facie-case stage of the proceeding, [the movant] need no

To prove endangerment in the custody-modification context, a party must show “a significant degree of danger, which includes danger purely to emotional and psychological development.” (emphasis added) (quotation omitted); (explaining that endangerment can include physical or emotional abuse).

(refusing to remand for missing findings of fact when “from reading the files, the record, and the court’ s findings, on remand the [district] court would undoubtedly make findings that comport with the statutory language”); n.1 (Minn. App. 2005) (applying this aspect of Grein).

(refusing to remand for missing findings of fact when “from reading the files, the record, and the court’s findings, on remand the [district] court would undoubtedly make findings that comport with the statutory language”); n.1 (Minn. App. 2005) (applying this aspect of Grein).

P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored) ; (declining to remand in a child-custody case when “from reading the files, the record, and the [district] court’s findings, on remand the [district] court would undoubtedly make findings that comport with the statutory language” and reach the same result); n.1 (Minn. App. 2005) (declining to remand in a custody dispute when doing so “would be futile at this juncture” (citing Grein, d at 387)).

Whether the final dissolution judgment unambiguously did that here by granting the parenting consultant power beyond the scope of the parties’ agreement “is a legal question.”

P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored); (declining to remand in a child-custody case when “from reading the files, the record, and the [district] court’s findings, on remand the [district] court would undoubtedly make findings that comport with the statutory language” and reach the same result); n.1 (Minn. App. 2005) (declining to remand in a custody dispute when doing so “would be futile at this juncture” (citing Grein)).

-20 (Minn. App. 2005) (examining subsequent modifying order to determine whether dissolution judgment was ambiguous); Gray v. Farmland Indus., Inc., (noting that reviewing court must first determine ambiguity when “interpret[ing] or clarify[ing] an order”), rev. denied (Mi

But endangerment requires “a significant degree of danger,” which can be “purely to emotional and psychological development.” Goldman, d at 285 (quotation omitted); (quotation omitted).

P. 61 (requiring courts to disregard harmless error); (declining to remand when doing so 23 would not change the result); n.1 (Minn. App. 2005) (citing Grein and refusing to remand when doing so would be “futile”).

findings of fact regarding father’s parenting time, the result would not change.2 Therefore, any lack of findings specifically addressing 2 (refusing to remand child-custody case when “on remand, the [district] court would undoubtedly make findings that comport with the statutory language” and reach the s ame result); d 915, 920 n.1 (Minn. App. 2005) (refusing to remand issue of custodial parent moving children to another state when doing so “would be futile”); (stating that appellate courts “wi

See id.; Dahl, d at 124 (reversing and remanding for findings determining whether parenting time endangered the children); ( stating “courts should err on the side of requiring an evidentiary hearing when a child ’s health or emotional well -being are a t stake”).

“When de termining whether a party has established a prima facie case for child-custody modification, the court must accept the facts alleged in the movant’s affidavit as true and disregard any contrary evidence.”

1 “The endangerment standard requires a significant degre e of danger, which includes danger purely to emotional and psychological development.” Tarlan v. Sorensen , d 915, 922 (Minn. App. 2005) (quotation omitted).

v. Grein, (declining to remand and, instead, affirming a custody decision reached by the district court without explanatory findings of fact when “from reading the files, the record, and the court’s findings, on remand the [district] court would undoubtedly make findings that comport with the statutory language” and reach the same result); n.1 (Minn. App. 2005) (citing this aspect of Grein); see also Minn. R. Civ.

Leave to seek COLA adjustments was ordered by the Court on January [5], 2016, but not retroactively to the 2010 award date.” We note that, generally, “a district court’s construction of its own ruling is given great weight on appeal.”

“Whether a dissolution judgment is ambiguous is a legal question.”

(refusing to remand in a child-custody case when “from reading the files, 8 the record, and the court’s findings, on remand the [district] court would undoubtedly make findings that comport with the statutory language” and reach the same result); n.1 (Minn. App. 2005) (refusing, in a custody dispute, to remand when doing so “would be futile at this juncture” (citing Grein)).

review denied (Minn. Mar.

(–40 (Minn. App. 1985)).

(“[A] district court’s construction of its own ruling is given great weight on appeal”).

We note and appreciate the candor of Moore’s counsel in conceding that if “[t]he district court .

(declining to remand and affirming when, “from reading the files, the record, and the court’s findings, on remand the [district] court would undoubtedly make findings that comport with the statutory language” and reach the same result); n.1 (Minn. App. 2005) (citing Grein).

at 290 (quotation omitted); (concluding that substantial change in circumstances had occurred since original custody decision after stating that, although father began expressing concern about daughter’s disproportionate weight gain around time of initial custody determination, his concern had escalated in recent years)