Cited by

An “initial aggressor” begins or induces an incident by engaging in activity that is a “good deal greater than mere conversation.” (d 405, 412 (Minn. 2006)).

He does, however, cite four cases that he says show that “the duty to retreat [arises] after a confrontation begins, or there is imminent danger, not before.” WL 2125770 (Minn. App. Feb.

(stating that the “duty to retreat relates to the election to kill, making a killing unjustified if the danger was reasonably avoidable,” and that the defendant’s self-defense claim failed where he had an opportunity to retreat when he shot the victim while the defendant “was in the driver’s seat of

d 405, 411 (Minn. 2006) (“[T]he law does not permit or justify one who intends to commit an assault upon another to design in advance his own defense by instigating a quarrel or a combat with a view thereby to create a situation wherein the affliction of the intended injury will appear to have been done in self-defense.”

8 Second, although Baker unquestionably had a “duty to retreat and avoid danger if reasonably possible,” it is similarly unclear whether any possibility of retreat was reasonable once Anderson raised his gun and presented an imminent threat of death.

at 631 (quotation omitted); (“In evaluating whether a rational basis exists in the evidence for a jury instruction, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction.”); (emphasizing that “both credibility determinations and the we

It is not error for the district court to modify a model jury instruction “to fit the contentions of the parties.” –12 (Minn. 2006); (“Although district courts may favor pattern jury instructions, their use is not required.”).

In evaluating whether to give an instruction, “the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction.”

In evaluating whether to give an instruction, “the evidence is view ed in the light most favorable to the party reque sting the instruction.” State v. Edwards

“In evaluating whether a rational basis exists in the evidence for a jury instruction, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction.”

“In evaluating whether a rational basis exists in the evidence for a jury instruction, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction.” .

6 is viewed in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction.”

When evaluating whether a basis exists in the evidence for a jury in struction, the district court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction.”

f self is justified if (1) the killing was “done in the belief that it was necessary to avert death or grievous bodily harm,” (2) the defendant made a judgment “as to the gravity of the peril to which he was exposed” that w as “reasonable under the circumstances,” and (3) a reasonable person would have made the same choice to kill “in light of the danger to be apprehended.” State v. Edwards

In determining whether the prima facie showing has been made, “the evid ence is viewed in the light mos t favorable to the party requesting the instruction.” State v. Edwards

(); (describing the four elements of self-defense in a homicide case as (1) the absence of aggression or provocation; (2) an actual and honest belief of imminent danger of death or great

statute,” because he “did nothing culpable or blameworthy before he was shoved, tackled and placed in a choke hold by T.T.” Eggermont relies on the dissenting opinion in State v. Edwards, which identifies a “flaw in CRIMJIG 7.07” in “that it does not require a finding that the defendant was in some way culpable in beginning the ‘incident.’” 8 (Hanson, J., dissenting).

with one another at the vehicle.” In State v. Edwards, we interpreted “began or induced the incident” 5 to contemplate conduct that is “a good deal greater than mere conversation” but did not define what is considered “more than conversation.” -12 (Minn.2006).