Cited by

“A witness’s prior inconsistent statement is admissible for impeachment purposes, but it is generally not admissible as substantive evidence.”

See Martin, d at 107 (stating that “any possible misconduct by the prosecutor was harmless” where “the jury was instructed to disregard the [prosecutor’s] statements”); (determining that the district court’s “instructions were sufficient to negate .

103(a); (“On appeal, the appellant has the burden of establishing that the trial court abused its discretion and that appellant was thereby prejudiced.” (quotation omitted)).

v. M.T.H., (“We cannot assume district court error.”); (“On appeal, the appellant has the burden of establishing that the [district] court abused its discretion and that appellant was thereby prejudiced.” (quotation omitted)).

” Davis, d at 539; (stating that “[c]umulative error exists when the cumulative effect of the errors and indiscretions, none of which alone might have been enough to tip the scales, operate to the defendant’s prejudice by producing a biased jury” (quotation omitted)); (“Although we find no one individual error that requires a new trial, the cumulative effect of trial error requires a new trial.”) .

( holding under Minn. R. Evid.

d 891, 902 (Minn. App. 2006) (finding that though the prosecutor elicited improper testimony, the damage was lessened because “appellant had every opportunity to cross- examine, and did so, regarding the challenged testimony.”) Once again, the district court “is in the best position to determine whether an error is suff

“A prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record but may not mischaracterize the evidence so as to mislead the jury.”

( stating that an “[a]ppellant is entitled to a new trial if the errors, when taken cumulatively, had the effect of denying [the] appellant a fair trial”).

(noting that, under Minn. R. Evid.

” (d 494, 497 (Minn. 1998)).

(holding that the jury instructions “were sufficient to negate .

“Vouching occurs when the government implies a guarantee of a witness’s truthfulness, refers to facts outside the record, or expresses a personal opinion as to a witness’s credibility.” (quotation omitted) .

(holding that the jury instructions “were sufficient to negate any prejudice that may have occurred as a result of misconduct”).

R., (“Overall, the instructions were sufficient to negate .

[t]he voluminous amount of hearsay, combined with the evidence of [his] alleged other bad acts and the violation of his constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, deprived [him] of a fair trial.” “[An a]ppellant is entitled to a new trial if the errors, when taken cumulatively, had the effect of denying [the] appellant a fair trial.”

Appellate courts “will assume that jurors are intelligent and practical people who take the district court at its word, and are guided by the plain language of the court’s instructions.”

(“Appellant is entitled to a new trial if the errors, when taken cumulatively, had the effect of denying appellant a fair trial.”).

versing and remanding for new trial because the district court’s erroneous failure to instruct on accomplice testimony affected appellant’s substantial rights); -53 (Minn.1983) (concluding that the state presented evidence sufficient for a jury to convict, but reversing and remanding on grounds of erroneous, prejudicial jury instruction); -07 (Minn.App.2006) (rejecting appellant’s contention that evidence was insufficient to support conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, but conclud

(noting that the district court “has wide discretion in deciding whether to impose sanctions” for a discovery violation).