Cited by

Doe 169 v. Brandon, (stating that existence of duty is generally question of law reviewed de novo); Germann v. F.L.

at 205-07; d 660, 667 (Minn. 2007) .

1a(1); (“The preclusion of consent as a 8 defense to statutory rape reflects the feeling of society in general that sexual contact by adults with children under 16 is reprehensible whether or not the child consents, because at that age, the child should be deemed incapable of consenting.”), aff’d

(stating that this court reviews denial of motion to amend a complaint to add claim for punitive damages for an abuse of discretion), aff’d

To succeed on her negligence claim, Gower must show “(1) [the] existence of a duty of care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation; and (4) injury.”

To succeed on her negligence claim, appellant must show “(1) [the] existence of a duty of care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation; and (4) injury.” .

The Ulvestads filed their 16 Appellate courts “review an order denying a motion to amend a complaint [to add punitive damages] for abuse of discretion.” aff’d

d 660, 664 (Minn. 2007).

To succeed on its negligence claim, respondents needed to show “(1) [the] existence of a duty of care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation; and (4) injury.”

But a duty to protect will be imposed if “(1) there is a special relationship between the parties and (2) the risk is foreseeable.”

“The basic elements of a negligence claim are: (1) existence of a duty of care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation ; and (4) injury.” , 664 (Minn. 2007).

“[W]hen the issue of foreseeability is clear, the court, as a matter of law, should decide it, but in close cases, the issue of foreseeability is for the jury.” Senogles, d at 43; see also Montemayor, d at 629; & n.3 (Minn. 2011); Bjerke v. Johnson , -68 (Minn. 2007); Ill.

The special -relationship doctrine concerns the circumstances in which a duty to protect arises, but has no bearing upon the application of immunity at issue here.

d 660, 664 (Minn. 2007).

f consent as a defense to statutory rape ‘reflects the feeling of society in general that sexual contact by adults with children under 16 i s reprehensible whether or not the child consents, because at that age, the child should be deemed incapable of consenting.’” (), aff’d

(applying de novo standard of review to district court’s interpretation of the law); (applying de novo standard of review when determining constitutionality of a statute).

See Bjerke v. Johnson , (requiring a court to view facts in the light most favorable to non-moving party for summary judgment).

2d at 22; Bjerke v. Johnson , d 660, 664 (Minn. 2007)).

d 183, 196 (Minn. App. 2007), aff’d

" Bjerke v. Johnson , , 669 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Olson v. Hansen , 299 Minn. 39 , , 127 (1974) ).

" Bjerke v. Johnson , , 669 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Olson v. Hansen , 299 Minn. 39 , , 127 (1974) ); see Armstrong v. Mailand , , 351 (Minn. 1979) (noting that the application of primary assumption of risk "is dependent upon the plaintiff's manifestation of consent, express or implied, to relieve the defendant o

On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we review de novo: “(1) whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact; and (2) whether the district court erred in its application of the law.” Bjerke v. Johnson

Bjerke v. Johnson , , 196 (Minn. App. 2007), aff'd ; see also M.H.

(stating that “[t]he district court’s decision to deny a motion to add a claim for punitive damages is reviewed for an a buse of discretion.”); aff’d

Domagala , d at 27 ; see also Senogles , d at 48 ; Montemayor , d at 629 ; Bjerke v. Johnson , , 667-68 (Minn. 2007).

True, a special relat ionship also may exist when “an individual, whether voluntarily or as required by law, has custody of another person under circumstances in which that other person is deprived of normal opportunities of self-protection.” Bjerke v. Johnson , (internal quotation marks omitted).

On appeal from a grant of summary judgme nt, we review de novo: “(1) whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact; and (2) whether th e district court erred in its application of the law.” Bjerke v. Johnson

However, a p erson may have a duty to protect another from harm caused by a third party if “(1) there is a special relationship between the parties; and (2) the risk is foreseeable.”

"[S]exual abuse of a child under the age of 16-a crime often referred to as statutory rape[,]" Bjerke v. Johnson , , 193 (Minn. App. 2007), aff'd , "reflects the feeling of society in general that sexual contact by adults with children under 16 is reprehensible whether or not the child consents, because at that age, the child should be deemed incapable of giving consent."

Montemayor v. Se-bright Prods., Inc., , 27 n.3 (Minn. 2011); -68 (Minn. 2007) (citing Whiteford, d at 918 ); III.

Further, “[w]hen the issue of foreseeability is clear, the courts, as a matter of law, should decide it,” but “[ijn close cases, the question of foreseeability is for the jury.” Whiteford, d at 918 ; see also Domagala, d at 27 n.3; -68 (Minn. 2007)

ow deliberate disregard necessary for a punitive damages claim); Bjerke v. Johnson , (affirming denial of a motion to add a claim for punitive damages when plaintiff’s affidavits showed “evidence of negligence sufficient for consideration by a jury, but not of deliberate disregard” by the defendant), affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds , LeDoux v. Northwest 12 Publ’g, Inc., (affirming denial of a motion to amend pleadings to add a claim of punitive damages because, although a new

This is true even when the person “realizes or should realize that action on her part is necessary for another’s aid or protection.” (quotation omitted).