Cited by

(rejecting due-process challenge to OFP when appellant had notice and opportunity to be heard and failed to show how other procedures were needed to protect her interests), aff’d

Our goal in statutory interpretation “is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2006)).

(quotation omitted), aff’d

(“The decision to award te mporary parenting time in an OFP is within the discretion of the district court .

The act provides that “a biological mother of a child who was not married to the child’s father when the child was born or conceived has sole custody of the child until specific court proceedings are held that determine custody issues.” (Meyer, J., dissenting) ; see Minn. Stat. § 257.541, subd.

” (quotation omitted), aff’d

“We may not add words to a statute that the Legislature has not supplied.” (declining to interpret a statute so as to “effe ctively rewrite” it because that prerogative belongs to the legislature).

-38 (Minn. 2008) (stating that a ROP establishes parent-child relationship and permits a father to commence an action to determine parenting time under chapter 518).

See, (reviewing an issue in the interest of justice even though the issue was not raised in district court proceedings that granted an OFP petition and also permitted supervised parenting time to an alleged abuser), aff’d

“A district court abuses its discretion by resolving the matter in a manner that is against logic and the facts on record.” (quotation omitted), aff’d

But, this court has determined that during an OFP hearing regarding the issues raised by the issuance of an emergency OFP, the challenging party has the right “to present and cross-examine witnesses, [to] produce documents, and [to] have [the] case decided on [the] merits.” aff’d, 1 1 Beardsley’s description of a “hearing” which described the “full hearing” requirement under the Domestic Abuse Act in effect during El Nashaar’s appeal.

s but contends that “the record makes clear that the district court [] moved through the hearing in such a way that there was no such right afforded.” However, “[a]lthough a petitioner in an OFP proceeding is entitled to a hearing, the failure to request a particular procedure, such as cross- examination, constitutes waiver.” aff’d

(awarding parenting time during an OFP proceeding based on an ROP); In re Child of B.J.-M.

v. Cold Spring Granite Co., aff'd (“[W]e are bound to apply the law as written.”); (declining to adopt interpretation of statute amounting to revision because “[t]he prerogative of amending a statute in such a fashion belongs to the legislature, not to this *172 court”); Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, (reiterating that courts may not write

r. And “even when there has not *630 been physical abuse of the child, the child may suffer emotional distress in the presence of an abusive parent; and a child exposed to violence may perpetuate that behavior.” (holding that in OFP proceeding, district court had discretion to curtail parenting time to parent who abused other parent), aff'd

(“When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is assumed to manifest legislative intent and must be given effect.” (quotation omitted)).

(declining to adopt interpretation of statute that would amount to revision because “[t]he prerogative of amending a statute in such a fashion belongs to the legislature, not to this court”); Martinco v. Hastings, 265 Minn. 490, 497 , (“If there is to be a change in the stat

-64 (Minn.2010) (noting that the MHRA specifically prohibits certain conduct in particular contexts, and declining to read a cause of action for discrimination for a person not a party to a contract, where the MHRA does not specifically provide one); (declining to interpret the statute so as to “effectively rewrite” it because that prerogative belongs to the legislature rather than the court); (“The policy-based argument ...

§ 645.16 (2008); (stating that language must be given effect when it is plain and unambiguous).