Cited by

d 48, 54-60 (Minn. 2024) (applying harmless-error review to erroneous admission of unredacted videorecording in which alleged victim made prejudicial comments about defendant); (concluding that district court erred by admitting unredacted videorecording containing inadmissible evidence); , 656-57 (Minn. App. 2018) (concluding that district court erred by admitting unredacted exhibit containing inadmissible evidence), rev. denied (Minn. Apr

See, 656 (Minn. 2011) (concluding that the bullet trajectory and wounds contradicted the defendant’s claim that the victim was standing and facing him at the time of the shooting); (concluding that bullet trajectory and wounds were consistent with the eyewitness testimony that the defendant was outside the van when he fired the first shot and inconsistent with the defendant’s testimony that he was inside the van when he fired the first shot in self-defense).

But the state may not “speculate without a factual basis.”

When making their arguments to the jury, a prosecutor may present “all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences that can be drawn from that evidence.”

Additionally, the State may present “all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences that can be drawn from that evidence.” d 155, 163 (Minn. 2009).

–43 (Minn. 1998); –800 (Minn. 2000); – 28 (Minn. 2005); –64 (Minn. 2009); Peltier, d at 803–05.

This principle “encourages defendants to object while in the trial court so that any errors can be corrected before their full impact is realized.”

The prosecution “may present ‘all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences that can be drawn from that evidence’ in its closing argument.” ().

And “[a] strong presumption exists in favor of finding that counsel’s representation was reasonable, and particular deference is given to matters of trial strategy, including which witnesses to call and what information to present to the jury.” 2

2012) (noting that “decisions about which witnesses to interview are typically matters of trial strategy that we will not review”); (noting that whether to cross-examine the state’s expert witness and failure to call alibi witnesses were matters of trial strategy that could not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); (noting that whether to cross -examine witness was a matter of trial strategy that could not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel ); (noting that failure to investiga

ty is no one else was there.” Scott is correct that, in certain circumstances, a prosecutor commits misconduct by stating that a witness is lying, see State v. M ayhorn, (concluding that the prosecutor committed misconduct by making a personal assessment of a witness’s credibility),3 or by disparaging the defense, Peltier, d at 804; (M inn.

Of course, attempting to conceal involvement in a shooting tends to weaken a self -defense theory, and here, Jackson did so by fleeing the scene, hiding his gun, and leaving the city.

Cf. State v. Pearson , -62 (Minn. 2009) (supreme court noted “numerous references” to request for counsel ).

State v. Pearson (Pearson I)

2 (declining to decide if a closing argument was misconduct because it did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights).

State v. Pearson , State v. Bobo

A p rosecutor may “present all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences that can be drawn from that evidence,” but may not “misstate the evidence.” State v. Pearson , (quotations omitted).

First, we agree that the prosecutor’s references to “straw man” arguments were plain error.3 The supreme court has held that “it is improper during closing arguments for the State to invite jurors to speculate as to the motivation for a defendant to try the case a specific way.”

During closing arguments, a prosecutor “may present all legitim ate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences that can be drawn from t hat evidence.”

During closing argument, a prosecutor “may present all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences that can be drawn from that evidence.”

See State v. Pearson , -62 (Minn. 2009) (concluding that a district court plainly erred by not removing references to a defendant’s right to counsel fro m a recorded police interview ); State v. Winter , (concluding that a district c ourt plainly erred by not redacting references to a polygra ph

d 155, 161 (Minn. 2009); see Minn. R. Crim.

(“Based on [appellant]’s numerous references to getting an attorney, the jury may have inferred that he was somehow concealing his guilt.

(noting that the doctrine of trial-error forfeiture “encourages [litigants] to object while in the trial court so that any errors can be corrected before their full impact is realized” (emphasis added)), (explaining that “[w]e do not decide issues

See, (“[A] lawyer may not speculate without a factual basis.” ()); -20 (Minn. 1980) (“Counsel have the right to present to the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence

the recordings should have been admitted to allow the jmy to evaluate Child B’s credibility even if she had already acknowledged making the prior in *272 consistent statements.

(concluding that whether 9 to cross-examine the state’s expert witnesses constitutes trial strategy); State v. Pearson