Cited by

It is well -established that “[a] defendant’s choice to exercise his constitutional right to counsel may not be used against him at trial.” ().

(stating that if the appellant cannot prove an alleged error affecting substantial rights, a court applying plain- error analysis “need not c onsider the other factors”); (stating that even if the district court erred, “a new trial is not warranted” under harmless -error analysis unless appellant establishes prejudice).

(explaining that the determination of harmless error in wrongfully admitted evidence considers the whole record, including all previously mentioned factors, with no one factor being entirely dispositive).

-42 (Minn. 2009), in which the prosecuting attorney offered into evidence the defendant’s invocation, during a custodial interrogation, of his right to counsel, but the supreme court concluded that it was harmless error.

(explaining when deciding what effect the admitted evidence had on the verdict, we 8 consider the strength of the evidence of guilt, how the evidence was presented and whether it was highly persuasive, if the evidence was used in closing argument, and the defense’s ability to effectively counter

State v. Hall , d 837, 845 (Minn. 2009).

The final factor is not conclusive, but “[o]verwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt is a f actor, often a very important one.” Id.

But, keeping in mind the presumption that a jury will follow the district court’s instructions, we conclude that the jury determined that Conant did not enter his father’s home w ith the intent to commit assault.

And the district court repeatedly inst ructed the jury abou t the state’s burden of proof and defined “reasonable doubt.” (presuming that jurors will follow instructions from the district court).

(noting that when a district court orders a jury to disregard a statement, we presume that the jury followed that instruction).

References to “prior crimes or prior imprisonment should generally not be admitted,” but any error in doing so does not warrant a new trial unless the defendant “demonstrate[s] that he was prejudiced by the error .” -43 (Minn. 2009).

State v. Hall , -43 (Minn. 2009).

See State v. Hall , (presuming that jurors will follow instructions from the district court).

Lastly, in support of his arguments.

“We have recognized that a defendant’s references to prior crimes or prior imprisonment should generally not be admitted in evidence.” State v. Hall

See S tate v. Hall , Haglund, d at 506.

There may be situations where the reference to a “victim” is “so overused that it results in unfair prejudice to a defendant and 5 therefore constitutes an abuse of the broad discretion vested in the district court.”

d 837, 841 (Minn. 2009).

d 837, 841 (Minn. 2009).

(“The use of ‘victim’ to describe someone .

But this court has 9 recognized that “doubts about instructions have not held sway in Minnesota courts, which in the years since Huffstutler have adopted a presumption that jurors follow instructions.” –59 (Minn. App. 2009) (), review denied (Minn. Oct.

“Determining whether a jury instruction should be given lies within the discretion of the 8 district court and will not be reversed but for an abuse of that discretion.” (quotation omitted).

(concluding that new trial was not warranted when reference to defendant’s prior conviction was of a passing nature and was not dwelled on or highlighted for the jury).

If the district court erred in admitting the telephone call evidence, the error is not harmless “if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different.” (quotation omitted).

at 257-58; (assessing whether error is harmless by viewing the “strength of the evidence of guilt”).

-43 (Minn. 2009) (considering argument that district court erred by not redacting portion of statement arising from police interrogation upon defendant’s objection).

“The district court has ‘broad discretion’ when it comes to the admission of evidence.”

-46 (Minn.2009) (concluding that the court need not address whether the trial court erred because any error was harmless).

(declining to reach the merits of a defendant’s argument because even if error was present it was harmless).

For ex *539 ample, we reversed a conviction based on the “cumulative effect of three instances of prosecutorial misconduct.” ().