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See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.1 (Supp. 2023) (providing that points should be added to a criminal- history score for prior felony convictions only when “ a felony sentence was stayed or imposed before the current sentencing or a stay of imposition of sentence was given before the current sentencing”)

We may also consider “legislative history,” including publicly available documents regarding the commission’s deliberations, Scovel, d at 557-58, 557 n.12, and commission policy and official interpretations

We have previously held that “[i]ssues not raised in the district court but raised for the first time on appeal are considered waived.” n.4 (Minn. 2012).

(“An issue is not properly before our court when it is raised ‘[f]or the first time in [a party’s] brief to our court.’ ” ( n.4 (Minn. 2012))).

State v. Campbell , (stating that the sentencing guidelines a pply only to felonies); State v. Williams , (describing the purpose of the sentencing guidelines ).

Before considering the merits of these claims, we must decide whether they are properly before us. An issue is not properly before our court when it is raised “[f]or the first time in [a party’s] brief to our court.” State v. Campbell , n.4 (Minn. 2012 ).

(interpretation of the sentencing guidelines is subject to de novo review) .

Guidelines 1.B.19.a, 2.B.1 (Supp. 2017)

Scovel , d at 554-55 ; State v. Campbell , , 4 (Minn. 2012).

We apply the rules of statutory construction to our interpretation of the sentencing guidelines.” (citation omitted).

See State v. Campbell , (“An offender’s criminal history is not factored into misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor sentencing.”).

State v. Campbell , , 7 (Minn. 2012).

" State v. Oreskovich , , 926 (Minn. App. 2018) (quoting State v. Campbell , , 4 (Minn. 2012) ).

Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016) ; see also State v. Campbell , , 4 (Minn. 2012).

Like statutes, when the language of the sentencing guidelines is “plain and unambiguous, it is presumed to manifest legislative intent and [a reviewing court] must give it effect.”

See State v. Campbell , , 4 (Minn. 2012).

While a district court's determination of a defendant's criminal-history score will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion, State v. Stillday , , 561 (Minn. App. 2002), we interpret the sentencing guidelines de novo and "apply the rules of statutory construction to our interpretation of the sentencing guidelines," State v. Campbell , , 4 (Minn. 2012).

State v. Campbell , , 4 (Minn. 2012) (citing State v. Williams , , 523 (Minn. 2009) ).

State v. Campbell , (“ We apply the rules of statutory construction to our interpretation of the sentencing guidelines.”).

The purpose of statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016)

We apply the rules of statutory construction to our interpretation of the sentencing guidelines.” (citation omitted).

D E C I S I O N “Statutory construction and interpretation of the sentencing guidelines are subject to de novo review.”

the supreme court addressed the determination of a criminal-h istory score under circumstances similar to Glass’s. The district court assigned Campbell one felony criminal-history po int for a 1995 robbery conviction for which Campbell had received a felony stay of imposition and a sentence within t

But “felony stays of imposition result in felony criminal history points no matter what period of probation the defendant receives.”