Cited by

argument because “[t]he function of the court of appeals is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them.” Sefkow v. Sefkow , (“Because this court is limited in its function to correcting errors it cannot create public policy.”), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000); (affirming district court despite appellant’s “meritorious policy arguments,” noting that “this court may not disregard unambiguous statutory language”), rev. dismissed (Minn. Nov.

But “parties are free to bind themselves to obligations that a court could not impose.” (quotations omitted).

CS-4 (Minn. 1988) (“The function of the court of appeals is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them.”); (“Because this court is limited in its function to correcting errors it cannot create public policy.”), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000) ; (affirming a district court despite appellant’s “meritorious policy arguments” for reversal, noting that this court “may not disregard unambiguous statutory language”); (citing this aspect of Leifur), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

State by Beaulieu v. RSJ, Inc., (noting a party’s “meritorious policy arguments” supporting his proposed reading of a statute but rejecting that proposed reading because “this court may not disregard unambiguous statutory language”).

See Leifur v. Leifur , (rejecting a party’s “meritorious policy arguments” because “this court may not disregard unambiguous statutory language”), petition for rev. dismissed (Minn. Nov.

We are an error correcting court, and it is not our place to contemplate policy considerations entrusted to the legislature; d 547, 554 n.7 (Minn. 2016); (noting a party’s “meritorious policy arguments” supporting his proposed reading of a statute, but rejecting that proposed reading of the statute because “this court may not disregard ambiguous statutory language”).

Though Egan makes arguably reasonable policy assertions about the discretionary authority of a district court pursuant to the statutorily created HRO special proceeding, we are “limited to identifying errors and then correcting them.” d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (citations omitted); (Minn. 2 Egan also directs us to Baker v. Baker, to argue that the district court has broad powers to order injunctive relief.

See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (“When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”); (noting a party’s “meritorious policy arguments” supporting his proposed reading of a statute, but rejecting that proposed reading of the statute because “this court may not disregard unambiguous statutory language”).

(refusing to reach a result consistent with what this court called “meritorious policy arguments” because doing so would require this court to “disregard unambiguous statutory language”), rev. dismissed (Minn. Nov.

n.2 (Minn. App. 2012) (noting the child-support statutes were renumbered in 2005).

d 40, 43 (Minn. App. 2012), review dismissed (Minn. Nov.

Id.; (noting that “meritorious policy arguments” were rejected because we “may not disregard unambiguous statutory language”).

Gomon, d at 416; (noting “meritorious policy arguments” were rejected because we “may not disregard unambiguous statutory language”).