Cited by

n.8 (Minn. 2016) (concluding that an issue raised for the first time at oral argument was waived).

.’” -33 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 474-75 (2016)).

.” (emphasis added); see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014) (“[W]here a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, .

Lueck relies on Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), to support his constitutional argument.

Instead, it acknowledged that the 11 d 216 (Minn. 2016), the Minnesota Supreme Court “applied the rule announced in Birchfield to hold that the warrantless blood and urine test refusal convictions under Minnesota’s test refusal statute were unconstitutional.” Aili, d at 444–45.

3 (2020); (concluding that “conducting 5 Two recent Minnesota Supreme Court cases have recognized circumstances in which obtaining a defendant’s DNA was not a search.

Accordingly, C-2 “[w]hen law enforcement seeks to conduct a search to uncover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, reasonableness typically requires law enforcement to obtain a judicial warrant before conducting the search.”

3 absent a search warrant or exigent circumstances); (applying Birchfield and holding that a person cannot be “prosecuted for refusing to submit to an unconstitutional warrantless blood or urine test”).

4 B. Second postconviction proceeding On June 5, 2019, Cibulka again petitioned for postconviction relief, asking the district court to vacate his 2012 conviction based on Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), which together articulated the Birchfield rule.1 Cibulka contended the Birchfield rule applied retroactively to his conviction under Johnson I

endment prohibits a driver from being convicted of refusing a blood test unless the officer obtained a search warrant or exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search; (2) which applied Birchfield to conclude Trahan could not be prosecuted for refusing to submit to an unconstitutional warrantless blood test; and (3) which extended Birchfield to warrantless u rine tests and concluded Thompson could not be prosecuted for refusing to submit to an unconstitutional warrantless blood or urine t

Johnson I and Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185-86 (2016) .

He also agreed that, when the o fficers asked him to submit to chemical testing, “they knew [he had] been drinking based upon their observations.” In 2016, the United Stat es Supreme Court decided Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016)

On October 12, 2016, d 224 (Minn. 2016), and applied the rule 1 Respondents were charged and convicted under prior versions of section 169A.20, the test refusal statute, which criminalized a refusal to submit to a blood, breath, or urine test in accordance with Minn. Stat. §§ 16 9A.51–.52

3 In 2017, Shaheed filed a postconviction petition, asserting that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s and State v. Thompson , rendered his conviction unconstitutional.

-30, 234 (Minn. 2016) (interpreting Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016)).

See Birchfield v. North Dakota , 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016) (holding that the states cannot impose criminal penalties on the refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test); (concluding that a person cannot be prosecuted for refusing to submit to an unconstitutional warrantless blood or urine test).

On May 23, 2017, Fagin filed a rendered his test- refusal conviction unconstitutional.

See 2017 Minn. Laws ch. 83, art. 2, § 4, at 356 (requiring search warrant for blood and urine tests ); § 10, at 360-66 (creating section 171.177 ); *847 State v. Thompson , , 227-33 (Minn. 2016) (citing Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 2160 , 2185, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) ).

.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (holding that "the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant," and that "[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances"); State v. Thompson , , 233 (Minn. 2016) (holding that warrantless urine tests are not permissible searches incident to ar

2(2); (“[T]he Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving.”).

On December 28, 2015, aff’d, cert.

subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” d 224, 228 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).

But the supreme court has since decided State v. Thompson, which held that “a warrantless urine test does not qualify as a search incident to a valid arrest of a suspected drunk driver.”

-31 (Minn. 2016) (holding in a related context that a urine test given under Minnesota’s implied-consen t law implicates a driver’s pri vacy rights under the Fourth Amendment).

2 In 2016, Ullrich petitioned for postconviction relief based upo n the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Thompson , which held that a person may not be prosecuted for refusing to submit to a warrantless blood or urine test unless an exception to the warrant requirement is shown to apply.

D E C I S I O N The district court’s order was based solely upon the grounds that a aff’d