Cited by

When reviewing the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, “we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error.”

g, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, delay caused by the defendant’s counsel is also charged against the defendant.” (quotation omitted)); (concluding that delay caused by counsel’s decision to leave the public defender’s office and request to reschedule the case is attributable to the defendant), aff’d on other grounds, (attributing defense counsel’s “need for time to prepare an adequate defense” to the defendant).

-46 (Minn. App. 2016) (considering whether an adult defendant’s speedy trial right under the Minnesota and United States Constitutions was violated when no speedy trial demand was asserted), aff’d

he apprentice “searched” Doleman’s property, we must determine whether the apprentice intruded upon the curtilage of Doleman’s property when 5 he viewed and took photographs of Doleman’s improperly stored firewood from the public street.1 “The land immediately surrounding and associated with the home, the curtilage, is part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” (quotations omitted).

See, e.g., Barajas, d at 218–19; – 44 (Minn. App. 2016), aff’d

3 , 845 (Minn. App. 2016) (holding that the appellant is responsible for delays caused by changing counsel as well as his counsel’s requests for continuances, unavailability, and decision to select later trial dates), aff’d

On appeal from a pretrial order denying a motion to suppress, “we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo.”

“Curtilage” is the area “immediately surrounding and associated with the home.” (quotation omitted); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (quotation omitted).

DECISION On appeal of a pretrial order denying a motion to suppress, “we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo.”

Rather, as expressed in State v. Milton, the plain-view exception has three elements: “(1) the police are legitimately in the position from which they view the object; (2) they have a lawful right of access to the object; and (3) the object’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent.” (quotation omitted); see also, n.2 (Minn. 2018) (identifying the same three elements).

but Chute is distinguishable.

In State v. Chute, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: “The backyard and driveway of a home are often considered to be within the curtilage of a home.” (cataloguing cases that hold that the driveway and backyard are curtilage in 3 “When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de

ajf'd on other grounds, aff'd

This constitutional protection extends to all places where an individual has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” See State v. Chute

See State v. Chute , -88 (Minn. 2018) (concluding that officer violated social norms by taki ng a circuitous route and by lingering too long).1 The implied license to approach a home does not extend through all hours of the night.

An individual’s home, and the “‘land immediately surrounding and associated with the home,’ the curtilage, is ‘part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’” (quoting Oliver v. United States , 466 U.S. 170, 180, 8 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1984)); see U.S. Const. amend.

State v. Chute , d 578, 583 (Minn. 2018).

See, -85 (Minn. 2018) (discussing a police officer’s implied license to enter property); d 736, 739 (Minn. 1975) (stating that Fourth A mendment applies to curtilage).

“The backyard and driveway of a home are often considered to be within the curtilage of a home.”

“A person’s home is clearly a constitutionally protected area, ” and a search of a home occurs if “the government physically intrudes onto a constitutionally protected area.” (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406-07 n.3, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 n.3 (2012))

Windish , d at 317 (citation omitted); see also State v. Chute , , 845 (Minn. App. 2016) (unavailability of police officer held against state under second Barker factor), aff'd on other grounds

" State v. Chute , , 584 (Minn. 2018) (quoting United States v. Dunn , 480 U.S. 294 , 301, 107 S.Ct.