Cited by

d 485, 491 (Minn. 2010).

(stating that the right against self-incrimination “applies only ‘when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976))).

an incriminating response.” State v. Heinonen , (quotations omitted).

“Miranda provides procedural safeguards to protect an individual’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination.” -21 (Minn. App. 2017), aff’d

sort out a confusing situation involving multiple occupants encountered in different parts of the house.” -22 (Minn. App. 2017) (determining that the defendant was not in custody, despite being briefly handcuffed and asked “routine” questions, when officers were executing a search warrant and encountered a dog and multiple occupants in the home), aff’d

On one hand, the supreme court has said that the Fifth Amendment “privilege is a bar against compelling communications or testimony” and that “making a suspect or accused the source of real or physical evidence does not violate it.” -94 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted) (stating that “providing a DNA sample was not an incriminating testimonial communication that triggered the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination”).

Interrogation is “express questioning or any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” (quotations omitted).

Rhode Island v. Innis , 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).

“An ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers to (1) ‘express questioning’ or ‘any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) ’ that (2) ‘the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit ’ (3) ‘an incriminating response from the suspect.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)).

And interrogation in the Fifth Amendment context is not limited to formal police questioning but also includes the “functional equivalent” of interrogation, that is, actions by law enforcement officers that “are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (footnote omitted); d 584, 589–94 (Minn. 2018) (applying Innis to determine whether police officers’ actions amounted to interrogation).

An interrogation is defined as “express que stioning or any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” State v. Heinonen , (quotations omitted).

State v. Heinonen , -90 (Minn. 2018).

n.4 (Minn. 2018) (“[W]hen we have expressed an opinion on a question directly involved and argued by counsel, even if that opinion is not entirely necessary to the decision, it ‘should not be lightly disregarded.’ ” 9 ()).

Howell relies on State v. Heinonen, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that “a defendant’s communication is only testimonial under the Fifth Amendment” if it “speaks his guilt.” (quotation omitted).

“An ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers to (1) ‘express questioning’ or ‘any w ords or actions on the part of police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)’ that (2) ‘the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit’ (3) ‘an incriminating response from the suspect.’” State v. Heinonen , (footnote omitted) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689-90 (1980)).

See 17 (holding that the officer’s “honest and straightforward” response to defendant’s question asking why officers wanted to take a DNA sample was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response).

Our recent decision in State v. Heinonen , provides a useful analogy.

State v. Heinonen , , 589 n.4 (Minn. 2018).